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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
he present work is a collection of the contributions presented at the workshop 
“Welfare, Intergenerational Distribution and Households: What Do Generational 
Accounting Tell Us?” held at the Instituto di Studi e Analisi Economica (ISAE) in 
Rome on 25 May 2002. Its purpose is to take part in the debate on long-term financial 
solvency of public debt and on the effects of current fiscal and social policies on both inter- 
and intra-generational distribution. Particular attention is paid to the effect of public policy 
on intra-family resources allocation. 
These themes are becoming ever more important as the present welfare system exerts a 
heavy pressure on all European countries. The demographic structure is changing 
considerably and significant important social changes are occurring. The longer life 
expectancy and the drop in fertility rate yield a higher dependency ratio. Nowadays, for 
each European citizen aged 60+, there are 2.5 persons between 20 and 60, while in 35 years 
for the same age individual there will be only slightly more than one younger person. 
 One of the main issues in the current debate on the implications of aging, alongside the 
consequently rising need to evaluate the long-run implications of the present public policy, 
is whether traditional public finance indicators can provide a comprehensive viewpoint on 
the phenomenon. New criteria able to shed light on the intertemporal dimension of fiscal 
policies and assess their effects both on the sustainability of the public budget and on the 
resource redistribution among different cohorts are indeed desirable. Even the European 
institutions suggest the adoption of indicators of long-run sustainability.
1 One of the 
possible methods proposed is Generational Accounting (GA), elaborated more than a 
decade ago by Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991, 1994) and Kotlikoff (1992) and 
applied, so far, in 25 countries all over the world. As is well known, GA is aimed at 
evaluating: a) the long-term sustainability of public debt, in terms of Intertemporal Budget 
Constraint
2 and b) the degree of intergenerational equity brought about by current fiscal 
policy.  
GA refers to the discounted value of what are known as net taxes (taxes paid minus 
transfers received from the general government by a generation over its remaining lifetime) 
under a variety of assumptions.
3 The sum of net taxes paid by current and future 
generations plus net financial liabilities must equal the discounted value of non-imputable 
general government expenditure. Whenever this constraint is not satisfied, the present fiscal 
policy is unsustainable in the long-run and it is generationally unbalanced. Hence, 
compared to deficit accounting, GA is a cross-analysis, meaning that it is not expressed by 
an annual value. It follows net payments through time, so that the share of deficit (or 
surplus) arising from each living generation during its remaining lifetime is computed 
under the unchanged fiscal policy assumption.
4 
                                                 
1 European Council (2001). 
2 It requires the discounted values of future primary budget surpluses to be equal to the current debt. 
3 There are two categories of hypotheses. The former concerns both some macroeconomic variables 
– productivity growth, discount, fertility and mortality rates – and different policy scenarios. The 
latter deals with the economic evaluation of some of the items which appear in public intertemporal 
budget constraints. As for the policy context, experts generally assume that generational accounts are 
solely affected by the economic policy that has already been implemented and not by changes that 
may possibly occur.  
4 The variation in the amount of per capita taxes (or expenditure) capable of repaying the debt is 
conventionally and exclusively attributed to future generations. 
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Apart from the viewpoint of sustainability, GA can be useful for fiscal policy decisions to 
know who is expected to finance government measures, and to identify the individuals 
facing the costs and benefits of such operation. Moreover, GA highlights some possible 
measures to restore intergenerational equity.
5 
Focusing on the equity issue, a potential extension of the GA approach is proposed in the 
paper “Intragenerational Distribution across Families: What do generational accounts tell 
us?” by Nicola Sartor et al., in which the focus switches from individuals to families as 
reference units. So far, GA has taken into account the individuals as tax units, thereby 
avoiding any analysis of the intragenerational redistribution of taxes and transfers across 
families of different kind and size. 
At present, family support is high on the policy agenda because of demographic trends and 
changes in the family structure. Firstly, within the EU the fertility rate is persistently below 
the replacement rate (it declined on average in EU member states from 2.78 in 1964 to 1.42 
in 1995, remaining constant henceforth). As a consequence, an increase in workforce 
participation required to counterbalance the raising dependency ratio will need to be 
attained in ways that do not discourage fertility decisions. Secondly, behavioural 
modifications – such as the increase in the likelihood of marriage dissolution and in out-of-
wedlock births – pose important challenges to social policy. The lower stability of couples, 
by increasing the weight of lone-parent families, affects the risk of poverty. The diffusion 
of this phenomenon has increased the concern of European institutions for issues of social 
exclusion and on the increase of social risks for a number of categories. More attention is 
devoted to a careful monitoring of fiscal and social policy impacts on families’ well-being. 
The need for a welfare system that is targeted to provide a minimum income – supporting 
low-income such as single- and non-working-parent families – and that is more consistent 
with a growing labour force participation is advocated.
6 
Apart from cash and in-kind benefits specifically meant for families with children (tax 
relief, family allowances, maternity and parental leave and the like), the feasible set of 
measures may include all public policies affecting their financial position. Moreover, those 
provisions may be implemented according to selective or universal schemes. A deeper 
analysis and a careful comparison of different social protection and taxation systems should 
be carried out, so as to analyse the combined effect of the enacted mix of policies. To this 
end, traditional methods may be integrated with an approach that allows one to evaluate the 
overall economic and financial relationship between the State and families. 
All these issues are addressed in the three papers presented below.  
The first paper on “Generational Accounts, Business Cycles, Fiscal and Family Policy in 
Finland, 1990-2000” by Reijo Vanne presents an updated application of GA for Finland 
                                                 
5 Some drawbacks of GA framework are highlighted in the literature. One of them lies in the 
oversimplifying use of a constant discount and productivity growth rate for forecasting, as well as in 
the application of a unique discount rate for all public budget items. This choice implies that the risk 
factor is the same for all the items contained in the public budget and for all generations. A number 
of theoretical shortcomings related to the exclusion of feedback effects (for example on the products 
price or on the modifications of the government’s behaviour), to the possible liquidity constraints of 
individuals and to the absence of intergenerational altruism that would eventually lead to 
counterbalance the GA results on differential incidence of taxes and transfers. See Haveman (1994). 
6 In particular, during the late 1990s, three important Communications by the European Commission 
(1995, 1997 and 1999) on Social Protection were enacted. During the year 2000, National Action 
Plans were required in order to fight against poverty and social exclusion. Furthermore, some 
structural indicators of social cohesion were established by the European Council in Laeken 
(December 2001). 
Traditional 
GA: An 
updated 
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following a traditional approach. It explores how the effects of fiscal policy and business 
cycles have been impacting on the generational fiscal burdens over the past decade, by 
comparing an application of GA conducted in the base year 1995 (European Commission, 
1999) with a new one based on 2000. Following a deep recession in the first half of the 
1990s, the Finnish economy has been experiencing high growth rates for the past seven 
years. Economic growth, together with a fiscal policy tightening, has led to an improvement 
of public finance indicators. A high primary balance of 6% of GDP was reached in 2000 
after the deficit of the early 1990s.  
GA conducted in 2000 highlights that these changes have led to a considerable decrease in 
IPLs (Intertemporal Public Liabilities) from 253 in 1995 to -95 in 2000 as a percentage of 
GDP. The intergenerational balance would therefore have required a tax rate increase of 
8.8% in 1995. Indeed, according to the simulation for 2000, the governments can reduce 
taxes by 3.4%. It is worth noting that the budget-side adjustment is not neutral from a 
generational viewpoint. If the intergenerational balance were reached by (reducing) 
receipts, younger people would benefit more than elderly. It is completely the opposite 
whenever the adjustment occurs via (increasing) expenditures.  
Some peculiarities of the Finnish economy ought to be taken into account when these 
results are considered. High variability of real growth rate and remarkable volatility of asset 
prices have characterised the business cycle and therefore affect GA computation.  
According to this point of view, the impact of different components on IPLs proves 
interesting. The latter consist of: explicit government net debt (as traditionally computed) 
and the shares related to “ageing” and “macroeconomics and fiscal policy”. Compared to 
the 1995 value, the ageing effect has risen, meaning that the population structure is still 
shifting towards older ages. In contrast, the explicit net debt was decreased, as was the 
wider “macroeconomics and fiscal policy” effect.  
In the 1995 EC study, a favourable economic and policy scenario was presented, which 
included measures to adopt in order to reach a generational balance. The economic 
performance prevailing over the past few years proved better than forecasted and the 
policies implemented have been consistent with the set of measures proposed in the EU 
study. Macroeconomics and fiscal policy factors caused a reduction in IPLs from a positive 
value of 147% to -191% as a percentage of GDP from 1995 to 2000. The effect of explicit 
net debt works in the same direction, even though it is smaller, ranging from -8% to -64% 
as a percentage of GDP. The improvement of intergenerational sustainability is therefore 
mostly due to macroeconomics and fiscal policy effect which reflects partly the business 
cycle.
7 
As to the volatility of asset prices, the paper raises the issue of how to manage such 
volatility. These features are usually disregarded, because the GA approach is risk- and 
inflation-free. The case of Finland presents however a particular feature, as a large share of 
public wealth is invested in domestic and foreign financial markets and the central 
government owns a remarkable amount of quoted stocks as well as pension institutions.  
Moving from the traditional method to the implementation of a new application of GA 
based on the family as the unit analysis (that is, tax unit) rather than individuals is 
attempted in the second paper by Nicola Sartor et al. on “Intragenerational Distribution 
across Families: What do generational accounts tell us?”. In this approach the assessment of 
net taxes is subject to family fiscal entitlements in addition to individual ones. As for 
expenditure, many public budget items are often granted through a non-universal system 
                                                 
7 One possible adjustment proposed by the literature (Haveman, 1994, Cutler, 1993 and Diamond, 
1996) is to correct the GA results for business-cycle effects.  
Family GA. 
First 
application to 
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and vary according to specific family features based on current legislation. As for receipts, 
the taxation burden strongly depends on family characteristics. 
In order to gain a broader understanding of the effects of social and fiscal policies, the 
extension of the GA approach to families is important.  It aims at evaluating the overall 
system of relations between the government on the one hand and families on the other, so 
as to identify the presence of redistribution across different types of families. 
The paper highlights the results of the extension of the traditional model to Italy, by 
exploring the impact on net taxes of some characteristics relevant for a number of fiscal and 
social policies – such as educational levels, marital and working status and the number of 
dependents. The paper assesses the family net costs as compared to important events 
occurring during the family lifetime (such as births) and detects any possible loopholes in 
the safety net.  
 In the so-called Family Generational Accounts (henceforth FGAs), the analysis is divided 
into three phases of analysis, dealing respectively with: a) the structure of Italian families, 
b) the attribution of taxes and benefits to individuals taking account of their belonging to a 
given family-type and c) FGA computation.  
The first phase enables us to calculate the timing of some important family events such as 
marriage, births, financial independence and the composition of Italian families according 
to the following parameters: gender, marital status, level of education (graduate or 
undergraduate) and working status (employed, self-employed, non-working). Sample data 
indicate that: a) the Italian modal family consists of a couple with two children, where both 
are undergraduate, the husband is an employee and the wife is non-working; b) the out-of-
wedlock births and non-traditional living arrangements are not statistically relevant in Italy; 
the first childbearing occurs at an high average age (25 years for undergraduate women 
with two or three children); and c) a non-negligible gap emerges at childbearing average 
age between graduate and undergraduate females (ranging from 4 years for the first child 
for women with two children to 1 year for the third child for women with three children). 
As for family formation, 50% of men are financially independent at the age of 24 (25 for 
women) and are married at the age of 29 with a one-year-younger wife on average. 
The second step lies in calculating the individual age profiles, by attributing all public 
revenues and expenses to individuals taking account of his/her characteristics, together with 
those of the family he/she belongs to. This procedure yields a very large age-profiles data-
set, which be useful for objectives from a generational viewpoint: for example, it is possible 
to calculate Family Generational Accounts, the final step in the analysis. In the paper, 
generational accounts for each family type are computed, under the assumption that 
individuals live in a certain family for their remaining lifetime. This has been done by 
summing up the individual generational accounts of each family member.  
The application of the above methodology has led to some important and interesting 
findings. Variations in fiscal burden according to differences in the number of dependents, 
the difference between net taxes paid by families of a certain type and those paid by the 
same type of family with one child less (the so-called marginal net subsidy or MNS) are 
calculated. This thus permits the evaluation of both direct effects due to the cash and in-
kind transfers benefiting families with children and the effect due to tax variations 
indirectly related to the presence of one additional child, due to a different consumption 
behaviour and/or level of earnings and wealth. 
It is worth noting that in Italy direct programmes are those mainly affecting the MNS, and 
among them a leading role is played by in-kind benefits (mainly education) rather than by 
cash transfers. The former are granted through a universal system. Limited amounts are 
transferred through a set of ad hoc family policies (such as family allowances, tax relief for _______________  WELFARE, INTERGENERATIONAL DISTRIBUTION AND HOUSEHOLDS ______________ 
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dependents; maternity and parental leave) and, in most cases, by a categorical scheme. A 
cross-family analysis illustrates that the MNS is strictly affected by tax variations caused by 
changes in family consumption patterns related to an additional child.  
Following these guidelines and focusing on the regulation viewpoint, the paper by Bernhard 
Seidel on “Family Burdens and the Transfers/Tax System in Germany” examines how 
families with children in Germany are subsidised by the government through specific 
programmes.  
The substantial number of large families facing a high poverty risk and the persistence of 
child poverty have raised concerns as to the effectiveness of current policies.  
The current set of provisions does not however sufficiently support low-income families 
with children on the one hand, and it might discourage workforce participation on the other. 
The support payment for dependent children (Kindergeld) – the most important direct 
benefit in terms of amount granted – shows many shortcomings mainly due to its 
inadequacy to offset child-raising costs. Moreover, social assistance for children living in 
jobless families is often higher than wages plus support payments for children gained by 
any family member who eventually finds a job.  
The issue of setting up a support system that reduces work disincentives is a challenge to be 
faced by institutions, especially in light of the large number of poor families in Germany 
with several children. Their low income is mainly related to the poor work qualifications 
possessed by adult family members. Moreover, it is all too natural to think that single 
parents (mostly females) have so much responsibility for their children’s education and 
caring that they cannot be employed in a full-time job – that is, a higher-wage job. In order 
to reconcile jobs and families and to encourage a higher female workforce participation, a 
wider diffusion of part-time work and in-kind benefits (such as a larger number of 
vacancies in nurseries and in all-day school) would be desirable. 
Focusing on policy issues, the necessity of establishing the family as the reference unit in 
order to cope with demographic, economic and social changes emerges. Cross-national 
similarities in these patterns require a common data set which is useful for the comparison 
of the different policies implemented within individual European countries. Nowadays, 
national policies targeted at the family differ in their use of cash vs. in-kind benefits, as 
well as in their degree of selectivity. Family-support provisions are therefore likely to show 
different levels of effectiveness. For this purpose, GA represents a suitable tool for 
addressing the issues of how and to what extent different public policies affect families’ 
well-being and for estimating the effects to be gained from policy reform. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Family 
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Germany  ________________________________  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY   ______________________________ 
 6 
References 
Auerbach, A.J., J. Gokhale and L. Kotlikoff (1991), “Generational Accounts: A Meaningful 
Alternative to Deficit Accounting”,  Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Working 
Papers, n. 9103, March, and NBER Working Papers,  n. 3589. 
Auerbach, A.J., J. Gokhale and L. Kotlikoff (1994),  “Generational Accounting: A 
Meaningful Alternative to Evaluate Fiscal Policy”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, n. 8 (1), Winter. 
Cutler, D. (1993), “Review of Generational Accounting: Knowing Who Pays, and When, 
for What We Spend”, National Tax Journal,  n. 46 (1), March.     
Diamond, P. (1996), “Generational Accounts and Generational Balance: An Assessment”, 
National Tax Journal, n. 49 (4), December. 
European Commission (1995),  The Future of Social Protection: A Framework for a 
European Debate, COM (95) 466 def. 
European Commission (1997),  Modernising and Improving Social Protection in the 
European Union, COM (97) 102 def. 
European Commission (1999), A Concerted Strategy for Modernising Social Protection, 
COM (99) 347.  
European Council (2001), “Council Recommendation of 15 June 2001, Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines”, European Economy, n. 72. 
Haveman, R. (1994),  “Should Generational Accounts Replace Public Budget and 
Deficits?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 8, n. 1, Winter. 
Kotlikoff, L. (1992), Generational Accounting: Knowing Who Pays, and When, for What 
We Spend,  New York: Macmillan Free Press.   
 7 
CHAPTER 1 
GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTS, FISCAL POLICY AND BUSINESS CYCLES  
IN FINLAND, 1990-2000 
REIJO VANNE
∗ 
he development of the Finnish economy has fluctuated the most among the present 
EU countries in terms of real growth and employment during the last 15 years. 
Foreign and domestic demand and technological change have been the underlying 
driving forces. In the late 1980s, inflation and real income expectations maintained 
domestic demand and private agents were running into debt. Due for example to the policy 
of the Bank of Finland, the inflation expectations were never met, and the inconsistency of 
the plans were exposed in the early 1990s. The debt crisis was strengthened by declining 
foreign demand. On the other hand, technological restructuring was rapid, and due to high 
unemployment, wages have risen slower than productivity since the mid 1990s. 
The minimum of annual real economic growth was -7% in 1992. The maximum, +5.7%, 
was reached in 2000. The maximum rate of unemployment, 16%, was reached in 1994, and 
the minimum of 3% is from the year 1989. In a Nordic-type welfare economy with high tax 
rates and large transfer schemes, the high unemployment rate variation resulted in a roller-
coaster pattern also in public sector revenue and expenditure aggregates. The minimum of 
primary balance, -8% of the GDP, was reached in 1993. The recent maximum was +6.4% 
in 2000. 
In addition to being a small open economy and having Nordic welfare state properties, there 
are some other institutional features that complicate assessing the state of current policy and 
public economy in the long run in Finland. The Finnish public pension system includes also 
the so-called second pillar of pension-scheme categories. Thus, the main part of public 
pension benefits are earnings-related and there are no ceilings for the benefits. The national 
pension benefits are means-tested against the earnings-related pensions and the scheme is 
of the pay-as-you-go type. 
The earnings-related pensions are partly funded, the funding rate being approximately 25% 
(Risku, 2001). The schemes for private sector employees and self-employed persons are run 
by private mutual pension insurance companies, industry-wide or company pension funds. 
The total value of their assets is nearly 60% of the annual GDP. Domestic and foreign 
bonds form 40% and shares quoted on the exchange 30% of the market value of the assets. 
All pension institutions as well as contributions and benefits are included in the general 
government sector in the national accounts. 
The Finnish central government owns quoted stocks as well as pension institutions. 
However, the gross debt of the central government is approximately the same size as the 
value of its assets, and the net financial wealth of the general government is almost equal to 
the wealth of pension institutions. The volatility of asset prices is another important point 
when assessing the state of the Finnish public economy. 
In an EU-wide project a research group produced generational accounts and related 
indicators for the member countries (European Commission, 1999 and Raffelhüschen, 
                                                 
∗The author is Chief Economist at the Central Pension Security Institute in Finland. The views 
expressed belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute. The author is 
grateful for the comments given in the workshop, especially for those given by the invited 
commentator Dr. Holger Bonin.  
Corresponding Address: Central Pension Security Institute, 00065 Eläketurvakeskus, Finland, 
Phone: +3589 151 22 86, fax: +3589 151 25 80, email: reijo.vanne@etk.fi .  
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1999a). The indicators showed a large intergenerational imbalance in Finland. The base-
year of the report was 1995, and as the above stylised facts indicate, the Finnish economy 
has changed a lot since then. Policy changes have taken place as well. The former standard 
of national accounts has been replaced with the European System of Accounts (ESA95). 
Nowadays it is also a common view that increasing longevity should be assumed to 
continue for a rather long period. 
The aim of this paper is to show how sensitive generational accounts are to business cycles 
and to discuss whether this sensitivity could be captured by the sensitivity analysis typically 
presented in association with baseline generational accounts. As a starting point we have 
the results of Feist et al. (1999) published in the above-mentioned EU-wide report. In this 
paper, the study whose base year is 1995, is called the EU study. The base year of the 
calculations of the present paper is 2000. 
In section 1 we outline the rather well-known approach of generational accounts. In section 
2 we present the data. The general results are presented and discussed in section 3. 
Conclusions are drawn in section 4. 
1.  Generational Accounting 
We follow generational accounting as presented in Raffelhüschen (1999b), and begin to 
determine generational accounts for current and future generations by calculating a set of 
figures as follows: 
(1) 
s t
k s
D k
k t s
k s k t r P T N
−
+
=
+ = ∑ ) 1 ( ,
) , max(
, , . 
In equation (1)  k t N , denotes the net present value (NPV) of all the future net taxes paid by 
the generation born in year k under the policy considered and discounted to the beginning 
of the base-year t. Net tax is defined as taxes paid minus transfers received and the value of 
public services consumed. r is the assumed annual discount rate. In equation (1), NPVs for 
the future generations, i.e. generations born after the year t, are also discounted to the year t, 
and not to the birth-year of the generation. NPVs are calculated separately for both genders, 
although this is not denoted in the equations. For generations born in year t or later, the 
result is the NPV of their life-time net taxes, and for generations born before t, the result is 
the NPV of the net taxes of the remaining life-span. 
k s P , stands for the number of members of a generation born in year k who survive until the 
year s. D represents the assumed maximum length of life-time, typically and also here 100 
years. In practice,  k s P , is drawn from a population projection, which are typically produced 
by the so-called cohort component method. We move beyond the explicit presentation and 
discussion of the method and assume increasing longevity until the year 2050. The 
assumption is implemented by decreasing mortality rates, i.e. increasing survival 
probabilities, for ages below 100 years, and assuming a certain death at the age of 100 
years. Decreasing mortality has a significant impact on the length of retirement days, and 
thus on the NPV of the life-time net taxes, ceteris paribus. In a more general case, we could 
also consider probability changes of “softer” transitions. We could, e.g. model transitions 
between labour market positions. One of the most remarkable cases is a rising effective 
retirement age. However, increasing longevity is the only type of transition we have 
assumed in this study. 
k s T , denotes the average net tax paid in the year s by a representative member of the 
generation born in the year k, and all types of taxes, transfers and services are taken into _________  GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTS, FISCAL POLICY AND BUSINESS CYCLES IN FINLAND  __________ 
 9 
account.  k s T , includes, among other variables, also the collective public services, and in this 
study the depreciation of the fixed capital as part of the value of public services. In the 
original version of generational accounting, neither individual nor collective public services 
were included in generational accounts. Public services were taken into account as a stream 
which should only be financed intertemporally by taxes (Auerbach et al., 1991). 
It is assumed that current policy is prevailing indefinitely.  k s T , is a sum of various types of 
taxes, transfers and services: 
(2)  ∑ =
i
i k s k s h T , , , , 
where i denotes the type of tax, transfer of service. If  i k s h , , >0, it is a tax, and if it is 
negative, it is a transfer of service. The difference s-k refers to the age of the generation in 
the year s. The future streams are first projected by age. Generally, projections based on 
sophisticated methods or expert knowledge may be available, but especially if that is not 
the case, projections are based on the assumed annual rate of productivity growth, g: 
(3)  ( )
t s
i k s t t i k s i k s g h z h
−
− − + = 1 ), ( , , , , , . 
Equation (3) assigns to each agent of age s-k in year s the same payment observed for 
agents of the same age in the year t, adjusted for productivity. The coefficients z are policy 
parameters to capture the changes that have taken place or are assumed to take place. 
Parameters may also be used as endogenous variables, which are solved in order to find an 
intertemporal balance. 
The generational account in the year t of the cohort born in the year  t k ≤ , is: 
(3) 
k t
k t
k t P
N
A
,
,
, = . 
The generational accounts for the future generations are defined as follows: 
(4) 
k k
k k
k k P
N
A
,
,
, = . 
k k P , is the number of children born in the year k and who are alive at the end of the year. 
According to equation (4) the generational accounts for future generations are NPVs of life-
time net taxes in the birth-year. 
If we compare the accounts of future generations to each other or to the account of the 
newly-born generation, we have to do the corresponding productivity adjustment, and when 
operating at the level of public economy, as in equation (1), we have to calculate the NPVs 
at the same moment. 
We now define the basic indicator of generational imbalance or unsustainability of the 
policy. The uncovered intertemporal public liabilities (IPL) of the base-year t,  t L , are 
defined as: 
(5)  ∑
∞
− =
− =
D t k
k t t t N B L , . ______________________________________VANNE   ____________________________________ 
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t B  is the net public debt at the beginning of the year t, and the N-values are defined in 
equation (1). Due to comparability across countries or the same country at different points 
of time,  t L  should be related e.g. to the GDP of the year t. If  t L  is unequal to zero, the 
policy considered is not sustainable. In case  t L  is positive, taxes should be raised or 
transfers and services cut. In case  t L  is negative, taxes are allowed to be lowered or 
benefits raised. 
The only indicators we consider here are  t L  and a tax change in terms of the parameter 
tax s z ,  which would make t L  zero. 
2.  Data 
The population forecast is basically that of Eurostat published in 1997. We have slightly 
modified the Eurostat baseline projection, and also continued the projections until the year 
2100. Eurostat has published a new revision in 2000 (European Commission, 2000), but the 
difference between the new and old versions is not remarkable. We assumed a total fertility 
rate of 1.75, net immigration of 5,000 persons annually and an increasing life expectancy 
until the year 2050, and constant mortality thereafter. The increase of life expectancy was 
approximately one year in a decade. The assumed annual net immigration figure is 
relatively small compared to the original population, only 0.1%. We have not applied any 
separate immigrant population modelling (Bonin et al., 1999).  
The growth rate of the Finnish economy has varied a lot during the last 15 years. Annual 
real growth rates of the output are presented in Figure 1. Growth rate variability is naturally 
reflected in the unemployment rates of Figure 2. Further, in a Nordic-type welfare society 
economic fluctuations have a strong impact on public expenditures and revenues. The 
development of primary balance related to the GDP is shown in Figure 3. Further, primary 
balances accumulate or decrease public net financial wealth, which was one of the key 
variables when calculating the IPL in equation (6). 
The real output was contracting for three years, in 1991-93, and the record decline was 
6.3% in 1991. On the other hand, the growth rates observed since 1994 have also been 
exceptionally high. The value of GDP was €95 billion in 1995 and €132 billion in 2000. 
Unemployment rates were rising rapidly in 1991-94, but they have declined rather slowly 
since then despite the rapid real growth. This is due to both rising participation rates and 
high productivity growth. The unemployment rate was 15.4% in 1995, in the base-year of 
the EU study, and in 2000 the rate was 9.8% of the labour force. 
There are two exceptional features in the Finnish public economy compared to the majority 
of the European countries. The Finnish public pension system is partially funded, and the 
pension institutions own stocks and other financial assets. Also the central government 
owns a remarkable amount of financial assets in addition to a remarkable loan portfolio. 
The volatility of stock prices strengthens the business cycle effects on the IPLs. In Figure 4 
we present the development of the public net financial wealth in the 1990s. 
Due to the partially pre-funded pensions, the public economy has typically run surpluses, as 
can be seen in Figure 3. In 1995 the net wealth was 12% of GDP according to the new 
financial statistics. The share was 8% according to the former standard, and the value was 
used in the EU study. At the end of 1999 the figure was as high as 64% of GDP, which is 
used here. _________  GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTS, FISCAL POLICY AND BUSINESS CYCLES IN FINLAND  __________ 
 11 
The main part of assets are covering the liabilities of the statutory earnings-related pension 
schemes, which are mainly run by private mutual insurance companies. The portfolios are 
managed as private investors manage their portfolios, but there are rather sophisticated 
rules for the part of total liabilities, which should be covered, as well as for a proper risk 
management. The pension funds ran surpluses also during the recession, and the gross debt 
was accumulated with the central government. 
In Tables 1 and 2, we desegregate public revenues and expenditures in 1995 and in 2000. 
The statistics standard has also changed here, and we follow the new standard also as to the 
year 1995. The aggregates are slightly different from those used in the EU study. The main 
statistical improvement from the point of generational accounting is that collective public 
services are separated from the individual public services. 
The tax rate has risen slightly from 1995 to 2000, which is due to higher employment, 
higher profits and thus higher income taxes. In fact, the nominal tax rates have been 
lowered. Lowering of taxes is also the expressed policy of the present cabinet which took 
office in spring of 1999. Social insurance contributions have declined, because the 
unemployment benefits can be financed by lower rates. 
The policy of the present government is that the expenditure of the central government, 
including the interest payments, should be kept constant in nominal terms. The policy has 
not completely succeeded, but it is reflected in the above expenditure figures. It should be 
noted that only one-fifth of the total pension expenditure is in the books of the central 
government. On the other hand, unemployment benefit expenditure has declined 
remarkably since 1995, and has made the cutting job easier for the government. The total 
pension expenditure was 10.8% of GDP in 2000, compared to 13.1% in 1995. 
As age profiles of the base-year taxes, transfers and services, we use the profiles of the EU 
study. For pensions we use a profile from the year 1999 (Central Pension Security Institute, 
2000), as well as for health insurance benefits (Social Insurance Institution, 2000). For 
social and health services we use a profile from the year 1998 (Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health, 2001). All the profiles are adjusted for the year 2000 so that the corresponding 
aggregates of national accounts are fulfilled. 
The profiles in Figures 5 and 6 are non-deflated. Increasing prices, wages and indexed 
transfers have a positive impact on the net taxes where they are originally positive, and a 
negative impact where net taxes are originally negative. However, the higher age where net 
taxes are equal to zero has shifted 3 years forward for both genders. The crucial age was 59 
years for women and 61 years for men. Also positive net taxes have changed more than 
negative net taxes, especially at the prime ages from 30 to 55 years. Rising employment 
rates are the underlying reason. Naturally, these changes are no surprise given the aggregate 
changes reported in Tables 1 and 2. Rising employment rates are observed also at higher 
ages of labour force, and in fact, the effective retirement age has started to rise. 
3.  Results 
The generational accounts of current generations defined in equation (3) are presented in 
Figure 7. Also the account for the generation to be born in 2001 is presented as defined in 
equation (4). The other curve in Figure 7 describes the accounts given that the IPLs are 
reset to zero by a sustainable tax rate change assumed to come in force in 2001. 
The two ages where the value of the generational account is zero are 6 and 49 years in the 
unbalanced current policy path. Positive accounts, denoting positive NPVs of net taxes, 
appear in a 12-year wider age range than in 1995. The lower age has declined and the 
higher age has risen by 6 years since 1995. ______________________________________VANNE   ____________________________________ 
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In Table 3 we present the IPLs and the respective required aggregate tax rate change to 
reset the IPL to zero at the baseline of this study and a comparison to the EU study baseline. 
The generational balance has improved dramatically from 1995 to 2000. The IPL indicator 
was 253% of GDP in 1995 and with the same productivity growth and interest rate 
assumptions it is -95% of GDP in 2000. In terms of a sustainable tax rate, instead of a 
requirement of raising the current tax rate by 8.8 percentages of GDP in 1995, the 
sustainable tax rate is now 3.4 percentage points below the rate of the year 2000. The tax 
rate was 46.4% in 2000, and thus 43.0% would be a sustainable tax rate, ceteris paribus. 
Following the approach of the EU study, we have separated the effect of population ageing 
on the IPLs. In 1995 it appeared to be 114% of GDP, and until the year 2000 it has 
increased to 159% of GDP. The reason is that the main part of the burden of ageing will 
materialise in the future also in 2000, but the burden will be met in a nearer future. 
However, in terms of primary surplus or deficit, population ageing started in 1995 in 
Finland. In order to find this out, we calculated the resulting primary deficit year by year in 
the 1990s using the 1995 age profiles and the age structures of the particular years. It 
appeared that the pure ageing effect on the annual deficit started to rise in 1995. The 
difference between the 2000 and 1995 deficits was approximately 0.5% of GDP. 
Table 4 includes a sensitivity analysis with respect to productivity growth and interest rate. 
The sensitivity results are organised in a rising order by the difference between the interest 
rate and productivity growth rate. 
The IPLs are in the range of 44 and -100% of GDP. The sustainable tax rate changes vary 
between 0.5 and -4.1 percentages of GDP. In Finnish long-run projections the annual 
productivity growth rate is typically assumed to be 1.5% and the real interest rate is 
assumed to be 3% (Klaavo et al., 1999). If this is the case, the IPLs were -24% of GDP, i.e. 
implicit public net wealth was positive. The sustainable tax rate change would be -0.4% of 
GDP. If productivity would grow 2% annually, taxes should be increased by 0.5 
percentages of GDP for the balance. The conclusion is that the public economy is now quite 
near an intertemporal and intergenerational balance in Finland. As to the tax and other 
decisions for the year 2001 made by the government and parliament, the net effect on the 
primary balance is assessed to be a deterioration of approximately 0.5% of GDP, which 
could be interpreted as sustainable policy if the productivity growth rate turns out to be 
1.5% and real interest rate turns out to be 3% in the long run. 
We next discuss whether the current situation was included in the sensitivity analysis 
scenarios of the EU study. A combined macroeconomic and fiscal policy scenario was 
presented in the EU study where IPLs appeared to be slightly negative as seems to be the 
case in light of the 2000 data. The combined policy included the following elements:  
1.  halving the unemployment rate from the 1995 level until the year 2005,  
2.  raising the effective retirement age by five years until 2015,  
3.  raising the social insurance contribution rates as high as 1.5 times the current value 
until 2035, and  
4.  cutting all the public services by 20% until 2010. 
The unemployment rate has not yet been halved from the 1995 level, but it has declined 
more rapidly than in the halving path. The effective retirement age has naturally not 
increased by five years in the past five years, but it is likely that the age indicator has been 
near the combined policy path. Unfortunately, there is not any precise new statistics on this 
issue available. It is clear that in practice a five-year increase in 20 years is a very ambitious 
target, and it cannot be reached by current policy. Ceteris paribus, the assumed rise of _________  GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTS, FISCAL POLICY AND BUSINESS CYCLES IN FINLAND  __________ 
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contribution rates would result in a 6% rise in the tax rate in 40 years, i.e. a 0.15% rise 
annually. In Table 1 we find that the tax rate has risen at the required pace in the passed 
five years. We find as well in Table 2 that public services have been cut approximately by 
10% compared to the 1995 level in terms of GDP percentages. 
Broadly speaking, the Finnish economy and fiscal policy have followed the best path from 
the point of view of intergenerational balance outlined in the EU study. However, the 
assumed phasing-in periods of the policy are not yet finished, and the assumed target values 
of the policy parameters have not yet been reached either, but it seems that 
intergenerational balance has already been achieved. 
In fact, in addition to the policy outlined in the EU study, there are two other instruments 
that have been used. First, social transfers and production subsidies have been cut. The 
decrease of social transfers is partly due to diminished unemployment, but especially 
transfers related to children or family policy have been decreased in relative terms. They 
are typically non-indexed, and adjustment decisions have not been made. Pension cuts have 
also been made but combined with earlier decisions and long transition periods, the overall 
result is that average pension benefits follow the productivity growth rate (Klaavo et al., 
1999) as was assumed in the EU study. Another issue is that the GDP share of pension 
expenditure has decreased due to the fact that factor income distribution has changed in 
favour of capital income. 
The development of capital income leads us to the other reason underlying the favourable 
intertemporal public debt position of the Finnish economy compared to the most favourable 
scenario of the EU study. Both capital income tax revenues and the value of public wealth 
react to changes in the market values of stocks and real estates. Capital income tax revenues 
are partly dependent on capital gains and partly on profits. Both are heavily dependent on 
business cycles, and the assumption of productivity growth rate cannot capture these 
effects, even though a variable rate was assumed. 
In the case of public asset values, the effects could be captured, in terms of generational 
accounts, by a variable interest rate or a variable rate of return on investments,  s r  or by 
separating the real interest rate of public gross debt and the real return on public financial 
assets. To manage these instruments in deterministic calculations, one should have an 
enlightened view on the rates of return in the near future. The interest rate of public debt is 
a much easier variable to predict. In the Finnish case the large public financial wealth is a 
special feature compared to other countries. 
4.  Conclusions 
The intergenerational balance has improved dramatically in the five years from 1995 to 
2000 in Finland. The economy has grown rapidly due to reallocated resources and product 
innovations as well as the favourable international economic development. Fiscal policy 
has aimed at decreasing public gross debt, and the pension institutions have taken measures 
to raise the actual funding rate of the earnings-related pension schemes. The mainstream 
has been to improve the return on the investments of the funds. 
In 1995 the Finnish public economy showed a severe unsustainability and intergenerational 
imbalance. In 2000 it is near balance, and probably, depending on the assumptions about 
the future, on the positive side. 
When comparing the generational accounting results of the year 2000 to the results in the 
EU study with 1995 as the base year, we find that the development has been even better 
than the most-favourable scenario presented in the 1995 study. The comparisons also raise ______________________________________VANNE   ____________________________________ 
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the methodological question of dealing with the variables that are the most dependent on 
business cycles, capital income tax revenues being a good example. 
There is a large public financial wealth in Finland. The wealth also includes risky assets, 
whose value is determined on the financial markets and the value is highly dependent on 
the business cycles. Stochastic approaches may be worth studying as to the management of 
high-risk variables in generational accounting. The difference between returns on risky 
assets and on government bonds is an argument for separating them in generational 
accounting. _________  GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTS, FISCAL POLICY AND BUSINESS CYCLES IN FINLAND  __________ 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Public revenue aggregates in Finland, 1995 and 2000 (% of GDP) 
Revenue     1995  2000 
    
Income taxes     17.4  21.0 
VAT and other indirect taxes     13.7  13.3 
Employers’ social insurance contributions     10.1    8.8 
Insured persons’ social insurance contributions       4.5    3.3 
Total = tax rate     45.7  46.4 
Source: Statistics Finland, National Accounts. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Public expenditure aggregates in Finland, 1995 and 2000 (% of GDP) 
Expenditure 1995  2000 
    
Pensions 13.1  10.8 
Unemployment    3.7    2.0 
Family policy (transfers related to children)    2.6    1.7 
Other social transfers    2.8    2.0 
Subsidies    2.8    1.5 
Individual public services  14.5  12.9 
Collective public services    8.3    7.6 
Other expenditures minus other revenues    1.1    1.5 
Total 48.9  40.0 
    
Primary surplus (+) or deficit (-)   -3.2    6.4 
Source: Statistics Finland, National Accounts. 
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Table 3. Intertemporal public liabilities (IPLs) with its components and balanced 
tax rate changes required at the baseline in 1995 and 2000 in Finland 
(% GDP) 
Item   1995  2000 
    EU study  Current study 
   g=0.015  g=0.015 
   r=0.05  r=0.05 
      
Intertemporal public liabilities, total   253    -95 
Ageing   114    159 
Explicit net debt      -8    -64 
Macroeconomy and fiscal policy    147   -191 
      
Balancing change of tax rate      8.8   -3.4 
 
 
 
Table 4. Sensitivity of intertemporal public liabilities and balanced tax rate changes 
to productivity growth rate and interest rate, base-year 2000 (% of GDP) 
 
  g=0.015  g=0.02  g=0.01  g=0.02  g=0.01 
  r=0.03  r=0.03    r=0.03  r=0.05  r=0.05 
       
Intertemporal public liabilities, total  -24  44   -58  -88   -100 
       
Balanced change of tax rate -0.4  0.5  -1.3  -2.7  -4.1 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Annual real growth rates of GDP in Finland, 1976-2000 (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Statistics Finland, National Accounts. 
 
Figure 2. Unemployment rates in Finland, 1962-2000 (% of labour force) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Statistics Finland, Labour Force Survey. 
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Figure 3. Primary balances in Finland, 1975-2000 (% of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Statistics Finland, National Accounts. 
 
 
Figure 4. Net financial wealth of the general government in Finland,1992-99  
(% of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Statistics Finland, Financial Accounts. 
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Figure 5. Age profiles of net taxes of males in Finland, 1995 and 2000  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Age profiles of net taxes of females in Finland, 1995 and 2000  
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Figure 7. Generational accounts of the year 2000 for the generations born in  
1900-2001 (% of GDP per capita) 
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CHAPTER 2 
INTRAGENERATIONAL DISTRIBUTION ACROSS FAMILIES: 
 WHAT DO GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTS TELL US? 
NICOLA SARTOR, CARLO AZZARRI, MARIA COZZOLINO, CARLO DECLICH, 
 VERONICA POLIN AND ALBERTO ROVEDA
* 
n recent years, the Italian debate on fiscal and social policies toward families has focused on 
the issue of dependents for two important reasons. The first one is related to the sharp and 
persistent decline of the fertility rate. Fertility decline is partly responsible for the increase 
in the old-age dependency ratio. This, in turn, causes a significant deterioration of the public 
finance outlook for the next decades. As a consequence, the highly questionable issue about the 
desirability and effectiveness of demographic policies is surfacing again in the political debate. 
The second reason is related to poverty, as the likelihood of belonging to a poor family 
significantly increases with the number of dependents. According to recent estimates by an ad-
hoc Commission,
1 in year 2000 the relative poverty rate amounts to 12.3% among all Italian 
families. The ratio increases to 15.1% if there is at least one dependent aged less than 18 and 
further to 25.8% if the family with young dependents lives in the “Mezzogiorno”.  The last two 
rates increase respectively to 25.5% (nationwide) and 33.7% (Mezzogiorno) for families with 
three or more children. 
As for the demographic issue, Italy experiences one of the lowest fertility rates in the world. 
Total fertility is below replacement since the late 1970s and reached its lowest value in 1995 
(1.18). Currently, Italy is second to Spain (1.22 and 1.15, respectively). Completed cohort 
fertility rates show a steady decline from 2.1 for women born in 1944 to 1.6 for the 1963 cohort. 
At the same time, life expectancy at birth has increased by 22 years over the last 60 years.
2 As 
one would expect, net migration flows have reversed their direction since the early 1970s, from 
net emigration to net immigration.
3 
The dreary demographic scenario, summarised by steady population decline and old-age 
dependency ratio increase,
4 and the persistence of poverty among families with dependents has 
stimulated a policy debate on the desirability of an increase of social protection of households 
with young dependents.  
The Italian welfare system is a mixture of the most recent approach based on universal 
programmes and the legacy of some of the old categorical schemes based on profession. As for 
families with dependents, the current system is mainly based on the public provision of health 
                                                 
*N. Sartor, V. Polin and A. Roveda: University of Verona, Italy. C. Azzarri, M. Cozzolino and C. 
Declich: Institute for Economic Studies and Analysis (ISAE), Rome, Italy. This research project is partly 
financed by ISAE and partly benefits from a Ministerial grant (“Ricerca MURST 2000”), being part of 
the larger research project on “Low fertility in Italy: between economic constraints and value changes”. 
The authors thank Rita Di Biase, Aldo Gandiglio (ISAE) and Roberto Prisco (University of Verona) for 
their support, and Roberto Cardarelli for his useful suggestions. Comments are welcome and can be 
addressed to N. Sartor, Dipartimento di Diritto dell’Economia, via dell’Artigliere, 19, 37129 Verona 
(Italy); e-mail: nicola.sartor@univr.it.  
1 The Commission on social exclusion, appointed by the Minister of Labour. See Commissione 
d’indagine sull’esclusione sociale (2001, tab. II-1,2). 
2 From 54 in 1930 to 74 in 1993 for men, and from 56 to 81 for women. 
3 Currently, the net immigration flow is estimated at 50,000 individuals per year. 
4 On the basis of the latest official demographic projections (see ISTAT 1997), total population begins a 
slow but steady decline from current 57 million to 24 million in 2115. The old-age dependency ratio 
increases from the current 26.9% to 38.2% in 2020, and reaches 60% in 2045 before settling at around 
55% thereafter. 
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care and education, the role of cash transfers and tax allowance being minor. Public transfers are 
supported by a rather generous regulation in favour of employed mothers. In the most recent 
years, the benefits have been gradually extended to fathers. A different approach is sometimes 
advocated, proposing the full income tax deductability of the expenses incurred by families in 
raising children. The debate reflects the apparently never-ending struggle between selectivity 
versus universality, on one hand, and between cash transfers versus merit goods on the other. 
The following work is part of a larger research project aimed at evaluating the financial effects 
on family incomes of the current set of public tax and transfer programmes. By estimating the 
net taxes paid/received by different families, the research aims at contributing to the analysis of 
any possible loophole in the social security net. 
In order to derive a concise measure of the financial effect of the various public programmes, 
the conventional generational accounting methodology (henceforth GA) will be applied to 
Italian families. The objective is to evaluate how public finances redistribute resources within 
generations when families are taken as the tax units. As a first approximation, only income 
effects will be estimated, as the model does not allow for any feedback effect (or substitution 
effect) from the existing policy instruments to individual behaviour. It will be discussed whether 
adding this intra-generational dimension modifies the results of traditional GA and its 
implications for the welfare systems  
1.  Conventional Generational Accounting 
Generational accounting assesses the impact of public finances and welfare systems on current 
and future generations. As is well known,
5 GA allows one to jointly consider: i) currently 
legislated entitlements to tax and transfers; ii) demographic changes and iii) the intertemporal 
constraints that ensure long-term public debt sustainability. 
For each representative member of the living cohorts, GA allows us to estimate the net present 
value of transfers paid and/or received from the state during its remaining lifetime, in 
accordance with sex and age. A generational account is obtained by summing up the discounted 
value of the various public programmes the cohort will receive/pay. For each individual member 
of a cohort, characterised by a certain age and sex, the value of the various public programmes 
is estimated on the basis of sample surveys, legal arrangements and entitlement rules. The 
estimate is such that, for each programme, the sum of values times the number of individuals 
alive in a certain year adds to the total outlays reported in the general government 
appropriations account for each of the tax and spending programmes. 
A set of GA is the present value of net tax/transfers the representative member of each of the 
living cohorts expects to receive/pay in the rest of his/her life.  
For a given base year, GA allow us to assess the long-term debt sustainability as well as the 
degree of intergenerational equity, under the assumption of unchanged fiscal policies. The 
public budget is projected into the future on the basis of a demographic forecast and of the 
estimate of the per capita tax and transfers. As for debt sustainability, the evolution of the 
primary balance (e.g. net of interest payments) into the future is compared to the intertemporal 
budget constraint. As is well known, the latter requires that the present value of future primary 
surpluses equals the level of the outstanding public debt in the base year. If the stance of the 
current fiscal policy is not sustainable in the long-run, the required change in the net per capita 
transfers is conventionally imputed to the unborn. The comparison between the net taxes paid 
                                                 
5 Generational accounting has been developed by Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991). Recent 
applications to the Italian case can be found in Sartor (1999, 2001), Cardarelli and Sartor (2000), Franco 
and Sartor (1999) and ISAE (1999). For an international comparison, see Auerbach, Kotlikoff and 
Leibfritz (1999) and European Commission (1999). ___________________SARTOR, AZZARRI, COZZOLINO, DECLICH, POLIN & ROVEDA  __________________  
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by the newborn (in the base year) and the unborn allows us to derive a measure of the degree of 
intergenerational equity.
6 
Table 1 reports the set of GA for the representative members of Italian cohorts alive in 1999. It 
can be noted that the accounts remarkably differ according to gender. While a male born in 
1999 expects to pay net taxes during the entire lifetime equal to €48,000,
7 a female belonging to 
the same cohorts will receive a net transfer equal to €74,000. The reason for such a large 
difference entirely depends on the lower labour participation in the labour market for women. A 
lower rate implies low labour income taxes and social security contributions; at the same time, 
non-active women are entitled to many public programmes, such as health care and survivors’ 
pensions. 
Table 2 reports the long-term sustainability, as well as a measure of intergenerational equity, 
based on the hypothesis that future fiscal policy will be the same as in 1999. Because of the 
unfavourable demographic scenario, the Italian fiscal policy still needs some tightening, as the 
intertemporal disequilibrium (a measure of public debt unsustainability
8) equals 31% of the 
outstanding public debt. At the same time, fiscal policy still appears to be generationally 
unbalanced, as, under unchanged entitlement policies for the current generations, future 
generations would be required to pay €27,000 more than 1999 newborns. Alternatively, 
intergenerational equity could be restored by a 2.5% tax increase or a 2.7% expenditure cut for 
all generations (living as well as unborn). 
2.  Generational Accounting for Families 
So far, GA has focused on individuals as tax units, thereby avoiding any analysis of the 
intragenerational redistribution of taxes and transfers across families of different kinds and 
sizes. The paper reports the methodological aspects and the first batch of empirical results of a 
new approach that has been developed to derive the family GA. As a first step, the research has 
followed a static approach, according to which a certain number of different types of families 
has been identified. Each of the individuals living in a certain year belongs to one family type, 
and will belong to the same type for the entire lifetime.
9 
The first problems to be dealt with are the choice of the unit (family or household) and the 
identification of the time horizon. Traditional GA deals with individuals, whose life is precisely 
identified by a date of birth and a date of death. In the case of families and households, there is 
no unique way to define a start and an end. According to infinite time-horizon models and 
dynastic models, a family can be seen as a never-ending social institution. For the purpose of the 
present research, the analysis has been focused on families.
10 While it is acknowledged that 
                                                 
6 However, see Cardarelli and Sartor (2000) for a concise survey of alternative indicators of sustainability 
and intergenerational equity. 
7 Under the standard hypothesis of a 5% discount rate and a 1.5% rate of per-capita productivity growth. 
8 See Cardarelli and Sartor (2000) for a discussion on the measurement of debt sustainability within the 
GA framework. 
9 The next step will bring some dynamics into the model, in order to allow individuals to switch from one 
family type to another (for example, from “married with children” to “single with children”), on the basis 
of a transition matrix. 
10 By “family” is meant a group of individuals linked by marriage (or any equivalent social arrangement) 
or parenthood. Thus a family is represented by parents and children. A “household” is a family line or a 
dynasty; it is used to indicate a group of individuals sharing the same house. Therefore a household is 
made up by two or more families. In the current paper, different families may well share the same house 
(we ignore this piece of information), therefore belonging to the same household.  _____________________ INTRAGENERATIONAL DISTRIBUTION ACROSS FAMILIES   ____________________  
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households are better suited to deal with some economic and financial relationships,
11 the 
analysis of families allows us to better determine the birth and the dissolution of this institution. 
The research has borrowed the notion of the “minimal household unit (MHU)” proposed by 
Ermisch and Overton (1985). According to Ermisch (1988, p. 24), “(a)nalysis is easier if the 
units are such that demographic influences on household formation and composition can be 
separated from economic influences. In particular, it would be helpful to separate instances of 
family formation and dissolution from household formation and dissolution. […] A minimal 
household unit is the smallest group of persons within a household that can be considered to 
constitute a demographically definable entity. It is definable in purely demographic terms in the 
sense that an individual, over his lifetime, moves from one type of MHU to another by means of 
a simple demographic transition or event”.
12 
Similarly, a “minimal family unit” (MFU) has been defined as a single adult or a couple of 
adults who are financially independent of their parents, regardless whether they still live in their 
parents’ house. During their life span, the couple/single may decide to have children, which will 
be part of the family as long as they are financially dependent from them. The family ceases to 
exist when all the adults have passed away.
13 
As for couple formation, the model considers the age at which one of the adults joins the other 
(conventionally, the male) and the average age difference of the couple, conditional upon the 
age at which the couple starts its life. 
The characteristics that have been taken into account in order to define the different types of 
families are: 
1.  the number of children (0, 1, 2, 3+);
14 
2.  the level of education of each adult (with or without university degree); and 
3.  the occupation of each adult (dependent worker, self-employed, not employed). 
As for the family formation process, the frequency distribution of the probability of the 
following states, conditional upon the age, have been estimated: 
4.  being financially independent of their parents; 
5.  being married; 
6.  (for women) delivering a child of n-th order, conditional upon having a certain level of 
education. 
As for the structure of the Italian families and the states 5 and 6, the probabilities are based on 
the sub-sample of cohorts aged 36-55.
15 The probabilities have been applied to the entire 
population, therefore assuming that social lifestyles and the structure of the labour market are 
                                                 
11 For example, households share some fixed costs, such as housing expenses. 
12 The four basic MHU types identified by Ermisch and Overton (1985) are: 
1.  childless, non-married adults; 
2.  single parents with their dependent children; 
3.  childless married couples; and 
4.  married couples with dependent children.  
13 Therefore, a widow as such is not considered as a “single”, but a member of a “married couple”, being 
the last survivor of that particular type of family. 
14 For the Italian case, the average number of children for families with more than 2 dependents is 3.1.  
15 The reason for choosing this age interval is two-fold. On one hand, empirical investigation based on the 
sample survey shows that at the age of 36 all individuals are financially independent. On the other, at the 
age of 55 all women have delivered their children and most adults are still working (only a small fraction 
of public employees enjoyed, before 1993, the possibility of an early-retirement scheme based on 
seniority – See Sartor, 2001, on this point).  ___________________SARTOR, AZZARRI, COZZOLINO, DECLICH, POLIN & ROVEDA  __________________  
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cohort-independent.
16 Combining all the different characteristics, 174 different kind of MFUs 
have been identified: 144 couples, 24 single women and 6 single men.
17 A detailed account of 
the analytical framework used to generate family data can be found in Appendix I.  
3.  The Structure of Italian Families 
The structure of Italian MFUs has been derived from the 1997 survey on households’ 
expenditures run by ISTAT (the National Institute for Statistics) which examines the 
expenditure structure, the level of income and the individual characteristics of 22,362 
households sampled out of 21.5 million. More than one MFU may be derived from one 
household, as the expenditure survey interviews all individuals sharing the same house. 
The structure of MFUs and the frequency distribution of the relevant events mentioned above 
are summarised in Tables 3a-b and 4 and Figures 1-3. According to the number of children, the 
modal type of MFU is represented by a couple with 2 dependents (Table 3a). When looking at 
each of the 174 different MFUs (Table 3b), the model family appears to be made up of two 
undergraduate adults (a male dependent worker and a non-working female) with 2 children 
(14.7% of all MFUs), followed by a similar family characterised by both adults being 
employees (9.0%) and by a family similar to the model type, but with one child only (6.8%). In 
general, sample data confirm the irrelevance of out-of-wedlock births and living arrangements 
different from marriage which emerges from previous demographic studies.
18 
As for family formation (Figure 1), non-zero frequencies are observed in the 15-35
19 range of 
age, 50% of individuals becoming independent by the age of 24 and 75% by the age of 28. 
Marriage occurs in the 20-43 range of age (Figure 2): 50% of married men get married by the 
age of 29, and 75% by the age of 32. The average difference of age between men and women 
monotonically increases with the age of marriage from –2 to +4 years, being equal to +1 and +2 
respectively at the age of 29 and 32. 
Table 4 and Figure 3a-f report the age at which females deliver their children, divided by 
graduate and non-graduate women. Overall, the average age ranges from 25 (relative to the first 
child for undergraduate women with two or three dependents) to 33 (the third child for graduate 
women). As one would expect, the age at which graduate women deliver their babies is higher 
than non-graduates, the difference ranging from a minimum of one year (the third child for 
women with three dependents) to a maximum of four years (the first child for women with two 
children). The higher volatility of frequency distributions for graduate women depends on the 
smaller size of the sub-sample, as 90% of women do not hold a university degree.
20 
21  
                                                 
16 A more realistic approach would require us to estimate the probabilities separately for each of the living 
cohorts. This, in turn, would require the availability of longitudinal data.  
17 Only single men without children have been considered, as sample data show that no single men appear 
to have dependent children at the third decimal level. Moreover, the scarcity of single men with children 
prevented further desegregation of data among different family types. 
18  See, for example, Palomba (1995). 
19 The relatively high age at which some Italians become financially independent is the counterpart of 
unemployment mostly affecting first-job seekers and the irrelevance of unemployment compensation to 
the latter category.  
20 The hypothesis that the two fertility sample distributions are generated by the same population 
distribution was tested. The null hypothesis was rejected at the 5% confidence interval using a Chi-square 
test (see Hogg and Craig, 1989, pp. 274-75).  
21 It is worth noting that the proportion of graduate men is lower than women. _____________________ INTRAGENERATIONAL DISTRIBUTION ACROSS FAMILIES   ____________________  
 27 
4.  Family GA: Some Results 
For each of the 174 MFUs, a generational account has been calculated by summing up the GA 
of each of its members. It is worth stressing that individual GAs relevant to MFUs substantially 
differ from traditional GAs. Both are calculated by summing up the net present value
22 of the 
different tax and spending programmes, whose algebraic sum gives the net tax which is 
expected to be paid in the remaining lifetime. However, while traditional GAs consider the 
entire lifetime, each individual GA relevant for any MFU considers only the part of the life that 
is spent by the individual as member of a family of a certain type.
23 Moreover, when summing 
up the individual GAs for families with children, tax and spending programmes which refer to 
children are added to adults” GA starting from the average age at which the woman has 
delivered the baby.
24 
Appendix II reports the methodological aspects relative to the estimation of the age, gender, 
education and occupation profiles relative to each of the 84 different tax and spending 
programmes into which the general government appropriation account has been divided.
25 
Tables 5a-d report the structure of generational accounts for the 48 family types, each being 
characterised by a different number of dependents (Table 5 a refers to families without 
dependents, Table 5b to 1 child, and so forth). The variability of net taxes is substantial. It 
ranges from €+141,500 (a net tax) to €-56,500 (a net transfer). All childless families face a 
positive net tax (ranging from €141,500 to €2,700), while 42% of couples with 3 or more 
dependents receive a net subsidy (a negative net tax, whose largest value reaches €56,500). The 
fraction of families with 1 or 2 dependents being in a credit position vis-à-vis the state is 
substantially smaller, being in both cases equal to 13%. As one would expect, families which, 
for a given demographic structure, pay the smallest amount of net taxes are represented by the 
unemployed, the singles and single earner couples. At the other extreme of the spectrum, 
employees pay higher net taxes than the self-employed, despite the fact that the Italian welfare 
system provides a higher coverage to the former. This is largely explained by the higher 
incomes reported, on average, by dependent workers.
26 
Along with the net tax paid, the value of the “marginal net subsidy” (henceforth MNS) has been 
calculated. The MNS represents the difference between the net taxes paid by on MFU of type j 
with n dependents (let’s define it MNS j,n ) and the net taxes paid by a MFU of the same type 
with one less dependant (MNS j,n-1). From a financial point of view, an MNS j,n indicates the 
amount of money that should be transferred to a MFU of type j at the beginning of its life in 
order to compensate it against a hypothetical situation in which all tax and transfer programmes 
related to the “marginal” dependent are abolished. Note that the value of the MNS reflects not 
only transfer programmes, public services and tax allowances directly aimed at dependents, but 
also tax payments that indirectly relate to the existence of an extra dependent because of any 
change of adults’ earning and spending arrangements. 
                                                 
22 Unless otherwise stated, a 5% discount rate has been used, as this value has been used as the baseline 
scenario in all GAs so far. 
23 For example, an individual spends the first 20 years as a member of a family made up by a couple and 
three children. From age 21 onwards, that individual may become a member of a childless couple. 
24 Therefore, the net tax paid/received by a one-year old child is added to the mother’s net tax when her 
age is i+1, where i is the average age at which the baby is delivered. 
25 The level of desegregation is the same as the one adopted for the traditional GA, summarised in Tables 
1 and 2. See also ISAE (1999) and Cardarelli and Sartor (2000) on this point. 
26 Note, however, that the higher average income may also reflect the higher tax evasion and erosion 
among the self-employed. Although data refer to sample surveys, and not to tax files, higher tax evasion 
partly affects individual reports to sample surveys. ___________________SARTOR, AZZARRI, COZZOLINO, DECLICH, POLIN & ROVEDA  __________________  
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Figure 4 reports the value of the MNS for four different family-types: i) a family constituted by 
a employee male and a non-working female (the so-called “modal family”); ii) a nucleus similar 
to i) but with a self-employed male; iii) a family with both adults being employees, and iv) a 
single undergraduate employee woman.
27 In each case the amount of MNS is presented 
according to the number of children (from 0 to 3). For the single woman and the family with the 
self-employed male, the MNS decreases with the number of children, whereas for the types 
where there is at least one employee the reduction of MNS is only related to the transition from 
the second to the third child. 
Tables 5a-d also present the main components of net taxes and highlight their relative 
importance for each of the different family-types. In general, it is worth noting that the net tax 
decreases as the number of children rises.  In case of three children, it becomes negative for the 
“modal family” and for the one with the self-employed male (the types sub i) and ii)). Such 
nucleuses are expected to receive from the Government net transfers whose net present value 
respectively amounts to €2,500 and €17,000. 
As for the MNS, it depends on: i) tax and spending programmes directly aimed at dependents 
and ii) the above-mentioned indirect effects caused by the change in family earning and 
spending patterns due to the presence of dependents. As for i), the direct programmes represent 
the largest source of subsidy. For the modal family, its net present value amounts to €54,000. 
The value is largely independent of family type, as most of public programmes are provided on 
a citizenship basis. Some differences exist among families with most of income represented by 
wages and salaries, on one side, and the remaining family types, on the other, reflecting the 
residual categorical component of the Italian welfare system. Cash transfers (maternity and 
family allowances) are more generous when the share of wages and salaries into family income 
exceeds 70%. 
As for ii), the indirect effects on MNS (Table 6) are primarily caused by the changes in 
spending patterns and, to a lesser degree, by changes in earnings. Different spending patterns 
imply a different amount of indirect taxes paid to the government, other things being equal. 
Three points are worth stressing on this point. First, the increase in indirect taxes paid (because 
of the larger expenditures needed to raise a child) more than offsets the amount of cash transfers 
linked to parenthood (tax credits and family allowances) so that, on average, a child still 
represents a source of a net tax burden to the family. Secondly, this effect is magnified when the 
share of wages and salaries as a percentage of family income is less than 70%. In other words, 
not only the cash subsidy is negative, but the burden is larger for families where the major 
source of income is not from employment. This implies that the risk of poverty is higher for 
some workers than others. Third, the size of the changes in the indirect component of the MNS 
are positively related to the level of education. When comparing the indirect taxes paid by a 
couple of graduate employees (family type FGEMMGEM – see the legend attached to Tables 
5a-d) with a couple of undergraduates (FNGEMMNGEM), the increase related to the first child 
is smaller for graduates (€1,209 as compared with €2,130).  
In most of the cases the amount of the indirect taxes paid reduces when the number of children 
exceeds one, reflecting the existence of economies of scale in spending. For example, during its 
entire lifetime the “modal” family with two children pays indirect taxes equal to about €5,700 at 
present value more than one-child family, whereas the additional burden amounts to less than 
€3,600 for the third son. 
Turning back to the overall size of the MNS, a difference can be observed with respect to the 
degree of education. When adults hold a university degree, the MNS is lower, as the net present 
value of benefits is smaller. As an example, for the first child the MNS for the modal family is 
                                                 
27 These are the characteristics of the most frequent single woman. _____________________ INTRAGENERATIONAL DISTRIBUTION ACROSS FAMILIES   ____________________  
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equal to €24,500 in net present value, while it equals €23,100 for a family identical to the modal 
one except for the education level of the adults. The diversity reflects two effects. The first one, 
which is relevant to the direct component of MNSs, depends on discounting. As mentioned in 
the previous paragraph, the average age at which women deliver their children is higher for 
graduate women. This implies that families with graduate women will receive public benefits at 
a later stage of their life, therefore reducing the net present value of the transfers. The second 
effect refers to the indirect component of MNSs. It is caused by the differences in the absolute 
amount of both direct and indirect taxes, and is independent of discounting. Tax payments are 
larger for families with graduated adults, as their incomes are, on average, higher then the 
undergraduates. However, as graduates enter the labour market later than undergraduates, the 
difference is partly offset by discounting. 
Finally, Table 7 reports the annual value of public programmes directly benefiting a family with 
dependents. Both the annual values and the net present values show that the largest programme 
is represented by education (59% of the net present value, or 54% of the undiscounted value of 
the MNS enjoyed by the “modal” family), followed by health care and by cash transfers – as far 
as a family characterised by a large incidence of wages and salaries is concerned. Given the low 
likelihood to incur health problems when young, the universal public health care system plays 
an insurance role rather than being a source of subsidy for the family with children, as it 
represents less than 11% of the MNS for the “modal” family. As for money transfers, a one-
child family yearly receives direct cash benefits whose magnitude declines with age, from about 
€7,500 when the son is 10 years old to €2,200 when he is 25. 
All in all, the Italian welfare system conveys the largest proportion of the subsidies aimed at 
children by the public provision of education. This perspective increases the relevance of the 
issues on the efficiency of public education, as well as its coverage of the population –
particularly for higher levels (secondary and university) which still benefit too small a 
proportion of the young. The role of monetary transfers is limited in size and scope, as this 
instrument is still characterised by a categorical scheme which favours dependent workers. 
There is ample scope for increasing the role of cash transfers as an effective way of fighting 
poverty among families whose adults are not employees. The major obstacle to the 
transformation of the current categorical system into an effective universal one is represented by 
tax evasion and erosion, which still substantially affects non-salary incomes. With high 
differences in tax avoidance, reference to a standard income threshold for granting cash 
transfers may increase inequalities.  
This study has shown that a relevant source of variability of the MNSs across family types is 
represented by the indirect effects of tax changes caused by the different income and spending 
behaviours. The effects of different spending patterns dominate the difference in earning 
profiles. Overall, the indirect change in taxes paid by families with different reproductive 
patterns offsets direct cash transfers. According to our estimates, the current set of cash transfers 
is not enough to fully offset the higher taxation even for the most-favoured family types (e.g. 
employees). Apart from the above-mentioned distributional issues, an increase in cash transfers 
is advisable to offset the higher indirect taxation that affects families with dependents. 
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Annex 1 
The Analytical Framework of Family Generational Accounting 
 
This annex illustrates the analytical computations needed to get the GAs for each family type. 
Let Pm,i and Pf,i be respectively the male and the female population aged i years, i ranging from 0 
to 101. 
Let  i m, Π ,  i f , Π and  i Π  be respectively male, female and mean surviving rates at age i. 
Let  i G, , 1 α ,  i NG, , 1 α  be fertility rates by age of respectively graduate and undergraduate women 
having only one child. 
Let  i G, , 1 α ,  i G, , 2 α ,  i NG, , 1 α ,  i NG, , 2 α  be fertility rates by age of respectively graduate and 
undergraduate women having two children. 
Let  i G, , 1 α ,  i G, , 2 α ,  i G, , 3 αγ ,  i NG, , 1 αγ ,  i NG, , 2 α e  i NG, , 3 α  be fertility rates by age of respectively 
graduate and undergraduate women having three or more children. 
The general case is  i sc nc , , α . 
Let  i m, Ω ,  i f , Ω  be the cumulated frequencies by age of male and female financial 
independence. 
Let  i m, Ψ ,  i f , Ψ  be respectively the male and female marriage cumulated frequencies by age. 
Let Wk be the weight of family k. 
Let  Mm,i,M  be the number of surviving married males aged i; Let Mm,i,S  be the number of 
surviving single males aged i; Let Fm,i,M be the number of surviving married females aged i; Let 
Fm,i,M be the number of surviving single females aged i.  i m i m i m M i m P M , , , , , * * Ψ Ω = , where 
Mm,i,s and Fm,i,s denote the marital status. 
Let Proj,k,m,i be the j-th profile of a male belonging to the k-th family at the age i, Proj,k,f,i be the 
j-th profile of a female belonging to the k-th family at the age i and Chj,k,i be the j-th profile of a 
child belonging to the k-th family at the age i.  
Profilej,k, - the weigthed j-th profile of the k-th family, is defined as follows: 
[] k
i
i k j s i m i f k j s i m i m k j k j W nCh Ch F o M o ofile * ) * ( * Pr * Pr Pr
101
0
, , , , , , , , , , , , , ∑
=
+ + =  
where nCh is the number of children in the family. 
In order to ensure that the sum of all profiles across all living individuals equals the 
Aggregate_Value reported in the General Government Appropriation Account, the mean value 
of each profile j (MVPj) is determined as follows: 
∑
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The average age at which each representative women with education ns delivers the first, 
second and third child can be easily obtained as 
i ns nc
i
i MAge , ,
101
0
* α ∑
=
=  
For each of the 84 different tax and spending programmes, the annual value paid/received by a 
family is calculated as the sum of individual values   
MAge i sc nc j i j i j i Child Woman Man FamGA + + + = , , , , ,  
Finally, the family Generational Account is determined as the sum of the net present values of 
the programs for the entire lifetime:  
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where ts is discount factor.  
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Annex 2 
The Estimation of Individual Profiles 
 
Individual profiles – that is, the average per capita value of benefits received and taxes paid by 
each type of individual – are estimated according to the methodology outlined in this Annex. 
The estimate is subject to the constraint that, for each of the 84 different tax and spending 
programmes, the sum of profiles across the population equals the aggregate value reported in 
the general government appropriation account (see Annex 1 and Table 8).  
1.  Individual Profiles 
Unlike the traditional approach, individual profiles are determined not only by sex and age, but 
also by the other individual characteristics that are assumed to be relevant to the analysis. 
Individuals are classified according to:  
1.  marital status: either single or married, the latter including divorced and unmarried couples;  
2.  education: graduate or undergraduate;  
3.  working status: worker or non-worker. In particular, a distinction is drawn between 
employed, unemployed, retirees with pensions from past working activity, on one hand, and 
retirees receiving “non-contributory” pensions, non-job-seekers (like housewives), and job-
seekers or non-dependant students, on the other; 
4.  profession: employee or self-employed; and 
5.  number of children: 0, 1, 2, 3+.  
In many cases, the legal arrangement is such that transfers benefiting a specific family member 
(e.g. the spouse or the child) are paid to the head of household (or to a working family member). 
Similarly, taxes are originated (at least partially) by family members different from those who 
actually pay the tax due. As a general rule, taxes paid or benefits received have been imputed to 
the family components causing them, even if he/she differs from the payer/receiver. 
Children's profiles have been associated with their mothers' attributes, the only exception being 
represented by the cases (such as family allowances) in which the fathers' characteristics may be 
relevant for the transfer/tax attribution to children. 
In all cases where the many relevant characteristics cause a fragmentation of the reference 
population into very small sub-groups,
28 due to the sample size, aggregations were made 
referring to the less relevant characteristics.
29 In these cases a standard profile was applied to all 
sub-group members. 
The following sections describe the methodology followed to estimate the most relevant profiles 
(in terms of overall financial effects on the public budget).  
1.1  General government  revenue 
Four different tax categories have been identified: direct taxes on labour, real capital (equities 
and real estates), taxes on financial capital and indirect taxes. 
Direct taxes 
The ISAE static micro-simulation model (Itaxmod) was used for the items concerning labour 
income taxation and real estate taxes. The model computes direct taxes and monetary benefits 
                                                 
28 By considering 2 modalities for gender, 2 for the civil status, 2 for education, 3 for the working and 
professional status and 4 for the number of children, 96 population sub-groups emerge. 
29 Interpolated values are computed for profiles presenting some age brackets gaps. ___________________SARTOR, AZZARRI, COZZOLINO, DECLICH, POLIN & ROVEDA  __________________  
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by applying current legal arrangements to the 1998 Bank of Italy Survey on Households’ 
Income and Wealth. The survey covers 7,147 families for a total of 20,901 individuals and 
includes detailed information on the main demographic and professional characteristics of the 
individuals, as well as their incomes, savings and wealth. 
As for the imputation criterion, the direct taxation burden is attributed to taxpayers, an exception 
being represented by taxes on residence home, which are split between parents and children. 
Indirect taxes 
Individual profiles have been derived from ISAE’s “Ivamod” simulation model, based on 
ISTAT (Italian Institute for Statistics) Survey on Households’ Consumption for the year 1997.
30 
The ISTAT sample surveys more than 22,000 families (about 64,000 individuals). There are 
approximately 500 variables relevant for the analysis, 300 of which refer to expenditure items. 
This allows to take account of detailed information on households’ consumption and their 
demographic and social-economic characteristics. 
In estimating indirect tax profiles, all family members of any age or working status have been 
assumed to give rise to some consumption of goods and are responsible for a share of the 
indirect taxes paid by the family. A set of the so-called “OECD modified equivalence scales” 
was used for the purpose. According to this approach, families of different sizes and 
compositions are transformed into “equivalent individuals”. The scale-composing coefficients 
indicate the larger or smaller amount of expenditure (or income) that is necessary for two 
households of different sizes and/or social-economic status to have the same well-being, under 
the simplified hypothesis that disposable income and expenditures on consumption goods 
determine family welfare. 
Letting  σ
i be the scale coefficient for the i
th family, C
i total consumption and CEQ
i the 
equivalent consumption, 
[1]     i
i
i C
CEQ
σ
= . 
The so-called “OECD modified scale” proves particularly suitable to the present purposes, as it 
attaches a different weight to individuals according to their age. In particular, it is expressed by 
[2]  ( )
i i i NMIN NAD 3 , 0 1 5 , 0 1 + − + = σ , 
where NAD and NMIN denote respectively the number of adults and minors (up to 17 years of 
age) living in the i
th  family.   
According to the OECD approach, dependents are assigned the larger consumption share for 
which they are responsible: their share of total consumption may be computed by comparing the 
total family expenditure with the expenditure the family should bear to maintain the same level 
of well-being, in the absence of dependents. The estimate is obtained by taking the ratio of the 
equivalence coefficients σ
i.  
Finally, to correctly compute the VAT. imputed to each member of the family, some 
expenditure items have been split into sub-groups, according to the different VAT. rates applied, 
using the official weighting coefficients relevant to the consumer price index. 
                                                 
30 1997 survey data were updated to 1999 on the basis of the percentage change of National Accounts 
aggregate data between the two years. _____________________ INTRAGENERATIONAL DISTRIBUTION ACROSS FAMILIES   ____________________  
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1.2  General government expenditures 
Four main categories are identified: pensions, social assistance, health care and education. 
Health care expenditure is further divided into expenditure for hospital care, drugs and other 
health services, while education is split into expenditures related to the school system and 
universities. Both are assumed to depend on age and gender as well as parents’ working status 
and level of education. 
Most expenditure profiles are computed on the basis of administrative data provided by ISTAT 
and INPS (National Institute for Social Security).  
Non-administrative data sources are used for family allowance profiles (computed through the 
Itaxmod model), and indemnity allowances covering professional risks (estimated on the basis 
of the Bank of Italy survey data). Old age and seniority pensions profiles are derived from an 
ad-hoc simulation model developed by Cardarelli and Sartor (2000) that allows us to take into 
account the future effects of the pension reforms enacted in the 1990s. 
 
 
 _____________________________________________ SARTOR, AZZARRI, COZZOLINO, DECLICH, POLIN & ROVEDA   ___________________________________________  
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Table 1. Generational accounts for all living cohorts (1999 euros ; r = 5% , g = 1.5%)   
          
          
Age   Total  Taxes on 
labour 
Taxes on 
capital 
Taxes on 
real 
estate 
Indirect 
taxes 
Social 
contributions
Other 
revenues
Health Education Pensions Labour 
market 
and 
family 
Other 
social 
security 
Assistence Other 
expenditures
Males                      
0 24,871  47,438  18,488  4,362 50,562 67,818 30,489 -20,716 -53,048 -29,823 -8,634 -1,368 -3,146 -77,553 
10 91,366  65,929  25,687  6,061 65,384 92,083 30,358 -21,524 -40,400 -38,233 -12,000 -1,787 -3,941 -76,251 
20 188,136  89,321  34,964  8,248 83,685 114,784 29,712 -24,821 -6,087 -45,615 -16,162 -2,254 -4,371 -73,269 
30 200,004  100,239  44,953  10,018 93,165 108,330 27,818 -27,810 -114 -63,127 -18,909 -2,717 -4,350 -67,492 
40  154,270 84,736 53,346 10,104 84,633 83,551 25,241 -32,272 0 -70,262 -16,119 -3,094 -4,356 -61,236 
50 -5,327  48,700  48,653  8,240 64,664 46,678 21,444 -37,119 0 -134,266 -11,867 -3,397 -4,740 -52,317 
60 -136,177  12,477  34,820 4,762 41,354 3,387 16,824 -39,588 0 -154,844 -6,021 -3,044 -5,785 -40,517 
70 -138,077 1,045  16,339 1,947 23,527 0 12,085 -35,676 0 -115,463 -5,141 -2,196 -6,027 -28,517 
80 -97,276 138  3,406 752 12,049 0 7,621 -24,207 0 -70,080 -3,004 -1,335 -5,128 -17,489 
90+  -56,822 33  174 30 6,375 0 4,638     -13,642  0 -38,476 -1,371 -732 -4,481 -9,369 
          
        
Females        
        
0 -38,079  27,705  6,815  2,363 34,530 42,724 28,403 -18,781 -52,217 -25,713 -5,318 -1,065 -4,503 -73,023 
10 2,790  38,612  9,493  3,292 43,503 58,437 28,228 -19,996 -40,035 -32,068 -7,412 -1,370 -5,929 -71,962 
20 69,557  52,473  12,986  4,492 54,223 73,650 27,601 -24,108 -5,857 -37,404 -9,964 -1,693 -7,345 -69,497 
30 61,728  52,226  16,657  5,468 57,426 69,069 26,087 -26,165 -70 -53,681 -9,513 -1,956 -8,791 -65,030 
40 2,084  38,132  19,350  5,785 51,060 45,076 24,284 -28,372 0 -73,566 -6,356 -2,204 -10,841 -60,265 
50 -82,829  15,851  21,847  5,076 41,260 16,618 21,694 -31,822 0 -100,769 -3,700 -2,409 -13,520 -52,955 
60 -121,103 2,352  18,448 4,029 32,944 305 18,222 -33,385 0 -99,215 -2,536 -2,227 -16,782 -43,259 
70 -100,534  531  14,209 2,518 23,112 0 13,610 -30,564 0 -72,675 -2,082 -1,650 -16,089 -31,454 
80 -72,711 110  5,008 750 14,036 0 8,757 -22,682 0 -45,338 -1,270 -1,043 -11,722 -19,317 
90+  -40,937 36  134 74 7,507 0 4,699 -12,509 0 -22,022 -689 -514 -8,255 -9,396 _____________________ INTRAGENERATIONAL DISTRIBUTION ACROSS FAMILIES   ____________________  
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Table 2. Conventional generational accounts, 1999 
Indicators of disequilibrium 
 
Difference in net taxes    €14,233 
(future generations minus born in 1999)   
 
Tax increase for future generations  7.9% 
 
Intertemporal disequilibrium (% of debt)  31.4% 
  
 
Tax increase for all generations  2.50% 
 
Expenditure reduction for all generations  -2.65% 
 
 
Table 3a. Italian family composition 
  Couples  Single M  Single F  Total 
Childless  6.44  6.17  4.41     17.02 
1 child  23.18  0.00  3.04     26.22 
2 children  40.77  0.00  2.35     43.12 
3+ children  12.63  0.00  1.02     13.65 
Total 83.02  6.17  10.81  100.00 
Source: Our elaborations on Istat (1997) data. ________________________ SARTOR, AZZARRI, COZZOLINO, DECLICH, POLIN & ROVEDA  ________________________  
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Table 3b. Italian family composition 
Childless Couples  Single 
  FEMALE Non-graduate  Graduate  MALE FEMALE
MALE   Non-
working
Employee Self-
employed
Non-
working
Employee Self-
employed 
  
Non-working 0.12  0.09  0.02 0.00  0.01  0.00 0.48 0.83  Non-graduate 
Employee  1.67 1.69 0.18  0.04 0.20  0.01  3.44  2.39 
  Self-employed  0.52 0.40 0.41  0.05 0.07  0.05  1.36  0.45 
 Non-working  0.00  0.02  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.07 0.01 
Graduate Employee 0.11  0.13  0.00 0.01  0.35  0.01 0.58 0.63 
  Self-employed  0.02 0.07 0.05  0.01 0.11  0.01  0.24  0.11 
 
1 Child  Couples  Single 
 FEMALE  Non-graduate  Graduate  MALE FEMALE
MALE   Non-
working
Employee Self-
employed
Non-
working
Employee Self-
employed 
  
Non-working 0.61  0.25  0.13  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.72 
Employee 6.88  6.35  0.82 0.18  0.46  0.11 0.00 1.62 
 
Non-graduate 
Self-employed 2.19  1.29  1.16  0.06  0.15  0.04  0.00  0.30 
Non working  0.05  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01 
Employee 0.47  0.56  0.08 0.09  0.65  0.05 0.00 0.32 
 
Graduate 
Self-employed 0.12  0.11  0.05  0.06  0.08  0.08  0.00  0.07 
 
2 Child  Couples  Single 
 
FEMALE Non-graduate  Graduate  MALE FEMALE
MALE   Non-
working
Employee Self-
employed
Non-
working
Employee Self-
employed 
 
Non-working  1.35 0.50  0.07  0.01  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.87 
Employee 14.75  9.02  1.12  0.13  0.92  0.04  0.00  1.08 
 
Non-graduate 
Self-employed  4.48 1.73  2.01  0.06  0.31  0.05 0.00 0.20 
Non-working  0.01 0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00 0.00 0.01 
Employee  0.74 0.77  0.07  0.18  1.15  0.13 0.00 0.18 
 
Graduate 
Self-employed  0.33 0.20  0.07  0.11  0.22  0.24 0.00 0.01 
 
3+ Child  Couples  Single 
 FEMALE  Non-graduate  Graduate  MALE FEMALE
MALE   Non-
working
Employee Self-
employed
Non-
working
Employee Self-
employed 
  
Non-working  0.69 0.08  0.07  0.00  0.01  0.00 0.00 0.53 
Employee  5.18 1.94  0.17  0.05  0.18  0.01 0.00 0.30 
 
Non-graduate 
Self-employed  2.09 0.34  0.70  0.01  0.08  0.04 0.00 0.12 
Non-working  0.00 0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Employee  0.21 0.19  0.01  0.06  0.26  0.01 0.00 0.06 
 
 
Graduate  Self-employed  0.05 0.04  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.04 0.00 0.01 
Source: Our elaborations on Istat (1997) data. _____________________ INTRAGENERATIONAL DISTRIBUTION ACROSS FAMILIES   ____________________  
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Table 4. Average age at birth 
  1 child  2 children  3 children 
    1st        2nd  1st       2nd  3rd  
 
Non-graduate  29  25  30 25 28 32 
Graduate  31  29  32 28 30 33 
    
Source: Our elaborations on Istat (1997) data. 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend to Tables 5a-5d  and Table 6 on the following pages: 
 
In the following order:  
Gender: M=Male, F=Female 
Education: NG =Non-graduate; G=Graduate 
 Occupation: NW=Non-working, E=Employee, SE= Self-employed 
Marital Status: S=Single, M=Married 
E.g. FNGNWMMGEM1 = Female Non-graduate Non-working Married Men Graduate Employee with 1 
child 
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Table 5a. Generational accounts for Italian families – Childless (euro) 
Family types  REVENUES  EXPENDITURES 
  DIRECT TAXES  INDIRECT 
TAXES 
SOCIAL 
CONTRIB.
OTHER HEALTH EDUCATION PENSIONS  TAX 
CREDITS 
FAMILY 
ALLOWAN.
UNEM. BENEFITS 
AND POV. RELIEF
MATERNITY 
ALLOWAN. 
OTHER NET 
TAXES
Labour tax  Capital tax                         
FNGNWMMNGNWM0 0  9,660  39,350 0 9,076 -10,835 0 -4,584  0 0 -637 0 -35,285 6,745
FNGEMMNGNWM0 33,110  9,360  44,552 54,047 9,122 -10,835 0 -22,777  -1,611 -2,292 -2,164 0 -38,573 71,939
FNGSEMMNGNWM0 30,412  10,381  44,873 15,954 9,233 -10,835 0 -9,331  -1,656 0 -276 0 -35,284 53,471
FGNWMMNGNWM0 0  9,660  39,350 0 9,076 -8,643 0 -4,584  0 0 -637 0 -35,285 8,937
FGEMMNGNWM0 28,910  9,535  42,617 38,570 9,055 -8,643 0 -22,777  -1,611 -2,292 -2,164 0 -38,552 52,648
FGSEMMNGNWM0 37,503  10,381  44,142 15,954 9,148 -8,643 0 -9,331  -1,656 0 -276 0 -35,284 61,939
FNGNWMMNGEM0 27,120  12,995  44,925 44,825 9,228 -10,835 0 -17,644  -2,950 -1,110 -1,650 0 -36,017 68,887
FNGEMMNGEM0 60,229  12,695  50,127 98,872 9,275 -10,835 0 -35,836  -224 -345 -3,178 0 -39,306 141,475
FNGSEMMNGEM0 57,532  13,716  50,448 60,779 9,385 -10,835 0 -22,390  -269 -340 -1,290 0 -36,016 120,721
FGNWMMNGEM0 27,120  12,995  44,925 44,825 9,228 -8,643 0 -17,644  -2,950 -1,110 -1,650 0 -36,017 71,079
FGEMMNGEM0 56,029  12,870  48,192 83,395 9,207 -8,643 0 -35,836  -224 -345 -3,178 0 -39,284 122,185
FGSEMMNGEM0 64,623  13,716  49,717 60,779 9,301 -8,643 0 -22,390  -269 -340 -1,290 0 -36,016 129,188
FNGNWMMNGSEM0 23,534  14,682  46,195 12,591 9,343 -10,835 0 -8,119  -2,961 0 -361 0 -32,482 51,587
FNGEMMNGSEM0 56,644  14,383  51,396 66,638 9,389 -10,835 0 -26,312  -235 -350 -1,888 0 -35,771 123,060
FNGSEMMNGSEM0 53,946  15,404  51,717 28,545 9,500 -10,835 0 -12,866  -281 0 0 0 -32,481 102,650
FGNWMMNGSEM0 23,534  14,682  46,195 12,591 9,343 -8,643 0 -8,119  -2,961 0 -361 0 -32,482 53,779
FGEMMNGSEM0 52,444  14,558  49,461 51,161 9,322 -8,643 0 -26,312  -235 -350 -1,888 0 -35,749 103,769
FGSEMMNGSEM0 61,037  15,404  50,987 28,545 9,415 -8,643 0 -12,866  -281 0 0 0 -32,481 111,118
FNGNWMMGNWM0 0  9,660  39,350 0 9,076 -8,643 0 -4,584  0 0 -637 0 -35,285 8,937
FNGEMMGNWM0 33,110  9,360  44,552 54,047 9,122 -8,643 0 -22,777  -1,611 -2,292 -2,164 0 -38,573 74,131
FNGSEMMGNWM0 30,412  10,381  44,873 15,954 9,233 -8,643 0 -9,331  -1,656 0 -276 0 -35,284 55,663
FGNWMMGNWM0 0  9,660  39,350 0 9,076 -8,643 0 -4,584  0 0 -637 0 -35,285 8,937
FGEMMGNWM0 28,910  9,535  42,617 38,570 9,055 -8,643 0 -22,777  -1,611 -2,292 -2,164 0 -38,552 52,648
FGSEMMGNWM0 37,503  10,381  44,142 15,954 9,148 -8,643 0 -9,331  -1,656 0 -276 0 -35,284 61,939
FNGNWMMGEM0 27,403  13,142  43,066 42,779 9,168 -8,643 0 -17,644  -2,950 -340 -1,650 0 -36,185 68,146
FNGEMMGEM0 60,513  12,842  48,267 96,825 9,214 -8,643 0 -35,836  -224 -345 -3,178 0 -39,473 139,963
FNGSEMMGEM0 57,815  13,864  48,589 58,732 9,325 -8,643 0 -22,390  -269 -340 -1,290 0 -36,183 119,209
FGNWMMGEM0 27,403  13,142  43,066 42,779 9,168 -8,643 0 -17,644  -2,950 -340 -1,650 0 -36,185 68,146
FGEMMGEM0 56,313  13,018  46,333 81,349 9,147 -8,643 0 -35,836  -224 -345 -3,178 0 -39,452 118,481
FGSEMMGEM0 64,906  13,864  47,858 58,732 9,240 -8,643 0 -22,390  -269 -340 -1,290 0 -36,183 125,484
FNGNWMMGSEM0 26,948  14,619  43,126 9,856 9,207 -8,643 0 -8,119  -2,961 0 -361 0 -32,413 51,260
FNGEMMGSEM0 60,058  14,320  48,327 63,903 9,253 -8,643 0 -26,312  -235 -2,292 -1,888 0 -35,702 120,790
FNGSEMMGSEM0 57,360  15,341  48,648 25,810 9,364 -8,643 0 -12,866  -281 0 0 0 -32,412 102,322
FGNWMMGSEM0 26,948  14,619  43,126 9,856 9,207 -8,643 0 -8,119  -2,961 0 -361 0 -32,413 51,260
FGEMMGSEM0 55,858  14,495  46,393 48,427 9,186 -8,643 0 -26,312  -235 -2,292 -1,888 0 -35,680 99,308
FGSEMMGSEM0 64,451  15,341  47,918 25,810 9,279 -8,643 0 -12,866  -281 0 0 0 -32,412 108,598
FNGNWS0 0  7,975  25,831 0 5,661 -6,743 0 -268  0 0 -361 0 -20,175 11,921
FNGES0 33,995  7,596  30,508 58,602 5,657 -6,743 0 -18,285  0 0 -1,981 0 -23,634 85,715
FNGSES0 45,845  8,641  33,854 22,099 5,698 -6,743 0 -6,355  0 0 0 0 -20,181 82,858
FGNWS0 0  7,975  26,387 0 5,681 -5,340 0 -268  0 0 -361 0 -20,175 13,899
FGES0   33,964  7,769  30,503 40,312 5,657 -5,340 0 -18,285  0 0 -1,981 0 -23,830 68,769
FGSES0 45,845  8,641  34,216 22,099 5,739 -5,340 0 -6,355  0 0 0 0 -20,181 84,664
MNGNWS0 0  2,297  22,042 0 5,423 -4,924 0 -124  0 0 -276 0 -21,688 2,750
MNGES0 34,997  5,747  26,840 56,817 5,442 -4,924 0 -13,212  0 0 -1,405 0 -22,592 87,709
MNGSES0 23,961  7,439  26,313 17,245 5,555 -4,924 0 -3,659  0 0 0 0 -18,576 53,355
MGNWS0 0  2,297  21,453 0 5,442 -3,972 0 -124  0 0 -276 0 -21,688 3,134
MGES0 34,997  5,747  28,681 48,155 5,556 -3,972 0 -13,212  0 0 -1,405 0 -22,430 82,117
MGSES0 23,961  7,439  28,506 17,245 5,593 -3,972 0 -3,659  0 0 0 0 -18,576 56,538 
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Table 5b. Generational accounts for Italian families – 1 child (euro) 
Family types  REVENUES  EXPENDITURES   
  DIRECT TAXES  INDIRECT 
TAXES 
SOCIAL 
CONTRIB.
OTHER HEALTH EDUCATION PENSIONS  TAX 
CREDITS 
FAMILY 
ALLOWAN.
UNEM. BENEFITS 
AND POV. RELIEF
MATERNITY 
ALLOWAN. 
OTHER NET 
TAXES 
Labour tax  Capital tax                         
FNGNWMMNGNWM1 0  9,671  42,765 0 10,909 -13,230 -13,257 -4,699  0 0 -637 0 -45,933 -14,411 
FNGEMMNGNWM1 33,110  9,469  48,011 54,047 10,971 -13,230 -13,326 -22,872  -2,176 -3,398 -2,164 -1,426 -49,325 47,692 
FNGSEMMNGNWM1 30,412  10,416  47,429 15,954 11,050 -13,230 -13,324 -9,956  -2,253 0 -276 0 -46,021 30,199 
FGNWMMNGNWM1 0  9,670  42,181 0 10,715 -10,763 -12,472 -4,688  0 0 -637 0 -44,943 -10,937 
FGEMMNGNWM1 28,910  9,646  45,250 38,570 10,736 -10,763 -12,472 -22,863  -1,590 -3,199 -2,164 -1,290 -48,317 30,455 
FGSEMMNGNWM1 37,503  10,413  47,298 15,954 10,793 -10,763 -12,472 -9,898  -1,641 0 -276 0 -45,023 41,889 
FNGNWMMNGEM1 27,120  13,006  47,011 44,825 11,014 -13,230 -13,257 -17,758  -3,210 -2,864 -1,650 0 -46,666 44,341 
FNGEMMNGEM1 60,229  12,804  52,257 98,872 11,076 -13,230 -13,326 -35,931  -789 -1,430 -3,178 -1,426 -50,057 115,872 
FNGSEMMNGEM1 57,532  13,751  51,674 60,779 11,155 -13,230 -13,324 -23,015  -867 -1,165 -1,290 0 -46,753 95,246 
FGNWMMNGEM1 27,120  13,005  46,426 44,825 10,820 -10,763 -12,472 -17,748  -3,150 -2,710 -1,650 0 -45,676 48,029 
FGEMMNGEM1 56,029  12,981  49,495 83,395 10,842 -10,763 -12,472 -35,922  -734 -1,350 -3,178 -1,290 -49,049 97,985 
FGSEMMNGEM1 64,623  13,748  51,544 60,779 10,899 -10,763 -12,472 -22,957  -810 -1,093 -1,290 0 -45,755 106,454 
FNGNWMMNGSEM1 23,534  14,694  46,774 12,591 11,085 -13,230 -13,257 -8,234  -3,222 0 -361 0 -43,131 27,245 
FNGEMMNGSEM1 56,644  14,492  52,020 66,638 11,147 -13,230 -13,326 -26,406  -800 -1,585 -1,888 -1,426 -46,522 95,757 
FNGSEMMNGSEM1 53,946  15,439  51,437 28,545 11,226 -13,230 -13,324 -13,491  -878 0 0 0 -43,218 76,452 
FGNWMMNGSEM1 23,534  14,693  46,190 12,591 10,891 -10,763 -12,472 -8,223  -3,162 0 -361 0 -42,141 30,778 
FGEMMNGSEM1 52,444  14,669  49,259 51,161 10,912 -10,763 -12,472 -26,398  -746 -1,491 -1,888 -1,290 -45,514 77,884 
FGSEMMNGSEM1 61,037  15,436  51,307 28,545 10,970 -10,763 -12,472 -13,432  -821 0 0 0 -42,220 87,586 
FNGNWMMGNWM1 0  9,671  42,765 0 10,909 -10,980 -13,750 -4,699  0 0 -637 0 -45,933 -12,654 
FNGEMMGNWM1 33,110  9,469  48,011 54,047 10,971 -10,980 -13,750 -22,872  -2,176 -3,398 -2,164 -1,426 -49,325 49,517 
FNGSEMMGNWM1 30,412  10,416  47,429 15,954 11,050 -10,980 -13,750 -9,956  -2,253 0 -276 0 -46,021 32,023 
FGNWMMGNWM1 0  9,670  42,181 0 10,715 -10,763 -12,472 -4,688  0 0 -637 0 -44,943 -10,937 
FGEMMGNWM1 28,910  9,646  45,250 38,570 10,736 -10,763 -12,472 -22,863  -2,121 -3,199 -2,164 -1,290 -48,317 29,924 
FGSEMMGNWM1 37,503  10,413  47,298 15,954 10,793 -10,763 -12,472 -9,898  -2,196 0 -276 0 -45,023 41,334 
FNGNWMMGEM1 27,403  13,154  45,057 42,779 10,964 -10,980 -13,750 -17,758  -3,210 -2,045 -1,650 0 -46,833 43,129 
FNGEMMGEM1 60,513  12,951  50,303 96,825 11,026 -10,980 -13,750 -35,931  -789 -1,430 -3,178 -1,426 -50,225 113,910 
FNGSEMMGEM1 57,815  13,899  49,720 58,732 11,105 -10,980 -13,750 -23,015  -867 -1,165 -1,290 0 -46,921 93,283 
FGNWMMGEM1 27,403  13,152  44,472 42,779 10,770 -10,763 -12,472 -17,748  -3,150 -1,891 -1,650 0 -45,843 45,059 
FGEMMGEM1 56,313  13,128  47,541 81,349 10,791 -10,763 -12,472 -35,922  -734 -1,350 -3,178 -1,290 -49,217 94,197 
FGSEMMGEM1 64,906  13,895  49,590 58,732 10,848 -10,763 -12,472 -22,957  -810 -1,093 -1,290 0 -45,923 102,665 
FNGNWMMGSEM1 26,948  14,631  46,541 9,856 11,040 -10,980 -13,750 -8,234  -3,222 0 -361 0 -43,062 29,409 
FNGEMMGSEM1 60,058  14,429  51,787 63,903 11,102 -10,980 -13,750 -26,406  -800 -2,263 -1,888 -1,426 -46,453 97,311 
FNGSEMMGSEM1 57,360  15,373  50,596 25,810 10,985 -10,763 -12,472 -13,432  -821 0 0 0 -42,151 80,485 
FGNWMMGSEM1 26,948  14,630  45,956 9,856 10,846 -10,763 -12,472 -8,223  -3,162 0 -361 0 -42,072 31,185 
FGEMMGSEM1 55,858  14,606  49,025 48,427 10,867 -10,763 -12,472 -26,398  -746 -2,169 -1,888 -1,290 -45,445 77,612 
FGSEMMGSEM1 64,451  15,373  51,074 25,810 10,925 -10,763 -12,472 -13,432  -821 0 0 0 -42,151 87,993 
FNGNWS1 0  7,987  31,097 0 7,407 -9,139 -13,257 -322  0 0 -361 0 -30,823 -7,411 
FNGES1 33,995  7,601  32,600 58,602 7,487 -9,139 -13,326 -18,315  -737 -2,441 -1,981 -1,426 -34,272 58,648 
FNGSES1 45,845  8,676  33,891 22,099 7,667 -9,139 -13,324 -6,960  -737 0 0 0 -30,919 57,100 
FGNWS1 0  7,986  30,357 0 7,213 -7,460 -12,472 -317  0 0 -361 0 -29,833 -4,888 
FGES1   33,964  7,769  32,026 40,312 7,292 -7,460 -12,472 -18,312  -668 -2,301 -1,981 -1,290 -33,475 43,404 
FGSES1 45,845  8,673  33,586 22,099 7,471 -7,460 -12,472 -6,903  -668 0 0 0 -29,920 60,250 
MNGNWS1 0  2,297  22,042 0 5,423 -4,924 0 -124  0 0 -276 0 -21,688 2,750 
MNGES1 34,997  5,747  26,840 56,817 5,442 -4,924 0 -13,212  0 0 -1,405 0 -22,592 87,709 
MNGSES1 23,961  7,439  26,313 17,245 5,555 -4,924 0 -3,659  0 0 0 0 -18,576 53,355 
MGNWS1 0  2,297  21,453 0 5,442 -3,972 0 -124  0 0 -276 0 -21,688 3,134 
MGES1 34,997  5,747  28,681 48,155 5,556 -3,972 0 -13,212  0 0 -1,405 0 -22,430 82,117 
MGSES1 23,961  7,439  28,506 17,245 5,593 -3,972 0 -3,659  0 0 0 0 -18,576 56,538  
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Table 5c. Generational accounts for Italian families – 2 children (euro) 
Family types  REVENUES  EXPENDITURES   
  DIRECT TAXES  INDIRECT 
TAXES 
SOCIAL 
CONTRIB.
OTHER HEALTH EDUCATION PENSIONS  TAX 
CREDITS 
FAMILY 
ALLOWAN.
UNEM. BENEFITS 
AND POV. RELIEF
MATERNITY 
ALLOWAN. 
OTHER NET 
TAXES 
Labour tax  Capital tax                         
FNGNWMMNGNWM2 0  9,685  49,089 0 13,322 -16,028 -28,739 -4,833  0 0 -637 0 -58,370 -36,510 
FNGEMMNGNWM2 33,110  9,576  53,885 54,047 13,385 -16,028 -28,888 -22,982  -2,873 -6,157 -2,164 -3,035 -61,859 20,017 
FNGSEMMNGNWM2 30,412  10,457  53,897 15,954 13,487 -16,028 -28,886 -10,686  -3,221 0 -276 0 -58,561 6,549 
FGNWMMNGNWM2 0  9,682  47,252 0 12,688 -12,999 -25,629 -4,798  0 0 -637 0 -55,132 -29,572 
FGEMMNGNWM2 28,910  9,540  49,534 38,570 12,711 -12,999 -25,629 -22,953  -1,605 -5,487 -2,164 -2,624 -58,374 7,431 
FGSEMMNGNWM2 37,503  10,447  53,268 15,954 12,811 -12,999 -25,629 -10,496  -1,626 0 -276 0 -55,296 23,661 
FNGNWMMNGEM2 27,120  13,020  52,665 44,825 13,397 -16,028 -28,739 -17,892  -3,877 -5,423 -1,650 0 -59,102 18,316 
FNGEMMNGEM2 60,229  12,911  57,461 98,872 13,460 -16,028 -28,888 -36,041  -1,486 -2,559 -3,178 -3,035 -62,592 89,127 
FNGSEMMNGEM2 57,532  13,792  57,474 60,779 13,561 -16,028 -28,886 -23,745  -1,834 -2,384 -1,290 0 -59,294 69,678 
FGNWMMNGEM2 27,120  13,017  50,828 44,825 12,763 -12,999 -25,629 -17,857  -3,694 -4,839 -1,650 0 -55,864 26,021 
FGEMMNGEM2 56,029  12,875  53,111 83,395 12,786 -12,999 -25,629 -36,012  -1,308 -2,291 -3,177 -2,624 -59,106 75,050 
FGSEMMNGEM2 64,623  13,782  56,845 60,779 12,886 -12,999 -25,629 -23,555  -1,611 -2,110 -1,290 0 -56,029 85,693 
FNGNWMMNGSEM2 23,534  14,708  52,824 12,591 13,465 -16,028 -28,739 -8,368  -3,889 0 -361 0 -55,567 4,171 
FNGEMMNGSEM2 56,644  14,599  57,620 66,638 13,528 -16,028 -28,888 -26,517  -1,497 -2,899 -1,888 -3,035 -59,056 69,220 
FNGSEMMNGSEM2 53,946  15,480  57,633 28,545 13,629 -16,028 -28,886 -14,220  -1,846 0 0 0 -55,758 52,494 
FGNWMMNGSEM2 23,534  14,704  50,987 12,591 12,830 -12,999 -25,629 -8,333  -3,705 0 -361 0 -52,329 11,292 
FGEMMNGSEM2 52,444  14,563  53,270 51,161 12,853 -12,999 -25,629 -26,488  -1,320 -2,585 -1,888 -2,624 -55,571 55,189 
FGSEMMNGSEM2 61,037  15,469  57,004 28,545 12,953 -12,999 -25,629 -14,030  -1,622 0 0 0 -52,494 68,235 
FNGNWMMGNWM2 0  9,685  49,089 0 13,322 -13,709 -29,810 -4,833  0 0 -637 0 -58,370 -35,261 
FNGEMMGNWM2 33,110  9,576  53,885 54,047 13,385 -13,709 -29,810 -22,982  -2,873 -6,157 -2,164 -3,035 -61,859 21,415 
FNGSEMMGNWM2 30,412  10,457  53,897 15,954 13,487 -13,709 -29,810 -10,686  -3,221 0 -276 0 -58,561 7,944 
FGNWMMGNWM2 0  9,682  47,252 0 12,688 -12,999 -25,629 -4,798  0 0 -637 0 -55,132 -29,572 
FGEMMGNWM2 28,910  9,540  49,534 38,570 12,711 -12,999 -25,629 -22,953  -2,695 -5,487 -2,164 -2,624 -58,374 6,341 
FGSEMMGNWM2 37,503  10,447  53,268 15,954 12,811 -12,999 -25,629 -10,496  -2,997 0 -276 0 -55,296 22,290 
FNGNWMMGEM2 27,403  13,167  50,623 42,779 13,332 -13,709 -29,810 -17,892  -3,877 -4,592 -1,650 0 -59,269 16,505 
FNGEMMGEM2 60,513  13,058  55,419 96,825 13,396 -13,709 -29,810 -36,041  -1,486 -2,559 -3,178 -3,035 -62,759 86,635 
FNGSEMMGEM2 57,815  13,939  55,432 58,732 13,497 -13,709 -29,810 -23,745  -1,834 -2,384 -1,290 0 -59,461 67,183 
FGNWMMGEM2 27,403  13,164  48,786 42,779 12,698 -12,999 -25,629 -17,857  -3,694 -4,007 -1,650 0 -56,032 22,962 
FGEMMGEM2 56,313  13,022  51,069 81,349 12,721 -12,999 -25,629 -36,012  -1,308 -2,291 -3,177 -2,624 -59,273 71,159 
FGSEMMGEM2 64,906  13,929  54,802 58,732 12,821 -12,999 -25,629 -23,555  -1,611 -2,110 -1,290 0 -56,196 81,803 
FNGNWMMGSEM2 26,948  14,645  50,477 9,856 13,397 -13,709 -29,810 -8,368  -3,889 0 -361 0 -55,498 3,690 
FNGEMMGSEM2 60,058  14,536  55,273 63,903 13,461 -13,709 -29,810 -26,517  -1,497 -3,627 -1,888 -3,035 -58,988 68,160 
FNGSEMMGSEM2 57,360  15,406  53,409 25,810 12,923 -12,999 -25,629 -14,030  -1,622 0 0 0 -52,425 58,205 
FGNWMMGSEM2 26,948  14,641  48,640 9,856 12,763 -12,999 -25,629 -8,333  -3,705 0 -361 0 -52,260 9,563 
FGEMMGSEM2 55,858  14,500  50,922 48,427 12,786 -12,999 -25,629 -26,488  -1,320 -3,313 -1,888 -2,624 -55,502 52,731 
FGSEMMGSEM2 64,451  15,406  54,656 25,810 12,886 -12,999 -25,629 -14,030  -1,622 0 0 0 -52,425 66,505 
FNGNWS2 0  8,001  40,032 0 9,843 -11,936 -28,739 -385  0 0 -361 0 -43,259 -26,804 
FNGES2 33,995  7,607  39,049 58,602 9,923 -11,936 -28,888 -18,350  -1,597 -4,201 -1,981 -3,035 -46,696 32,492 
FNGSES2 45,845  8,717  36,810 22,099 10,114 -11,936 -28,886 -7,666  -1,597 0 0 0 -43,459 30,041 
FGNWS2 0  7,997  37,587 0 9,209 -9,696 -25,629 -369  0 0 -361 0 -40,021 -21,282 
FGES2   33,964  7,770  37,192 40,312 9,289 -9,696 -25,629 -18,340  -1,373 -3,743 -1,981 -2,624 -43,648 21,492 
FGSES2 45,845  8,707  35,742 22,099 9,475 -9,696 -25,629 -7,482  -1,373 0 0 0 -40,194 37,493 
MNGNWS2 0  2,297  22,042 0 5,423 -4,924 0 -124  0 0 -276 0 -21,688 2,750 
MNGES2 34,997  5,747  26,840 56,817 5,442 -4,924 0 -13,212  0 0 -1,405 0 -22,592 87,709 
MNGSES2 23,961  7,439  26,313 17,245 5,555 -4,924 0 -3,659  0 0 0 0 -18,576 53,355 
MGNWS2 0  2,297  21,453 0 5,442 -3,972 0 -124  0 0 -276 0 -21,688 3,134 
MGES2 34,997  5,747  28,681 48,155 5,556 -3,972 0 -13,212  0 0 -1,405 0 -22,430 82,117 
MGSES2 23,961  7,439  28,506 17,245 5,593 -3,972 0 -3,659  0 0 0 0 -18,576 56,538  
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Table 5d. Generational accounts for Italian families – 3 + children (euro) 
Family types  REVENUES  EXPENDITURES   
  DIRECT TAXES  INDIRECT 
TAXES 
SOCIAL 
CONTRIB.
OTHER HEALTH EDUCATION PENSIONS  TAX 
CREDITS 
FAMILY 
ALLOWAN.
UNEM. BENEFITS 
AND POV. RELIEF
MATERNITY 
ALLOWAN. 
OTHER NET 
TAXES 
Labour tax  Capital tax                         
FNGNWMMNGNWM3 0  9,697  52,509 0 15,307 -18,331 -41,484 -4,943  0 0 -637 0 -68,608 -56,490 
FNGEMMNGNWM3 33,110  9,532  58,890 54,047 15,355 -18,331 -41,700 -23,073  -3,567 -6,977 -2,164 -4,440 -72,034 -1,352 
FNGSEMMNGNWM3 30,412  10,491  58,766 15,954 15,430 -18,331 -41,696 -11,286  -3,777 0 -276 0 -68,885 -13,200 
FGNWMMNGNWM3 0  9,693  50,701 0 14,670 -15,245 -38,846 -4,908  0 0 -637 0 -65,368 -49,940 
FGEMMNGNWM3 28,910  9,669  53,664 38,570 14,683 -15,245 -38,846 -23,044  -1,622 -6,494 -2,164 -4,040 -68,735 -14,693 
FGSEMMNGNWM3 37,503  10,480  55,658 15,954 14,733 -15,245 -38,846 -11,096  -1,649 0 -276 0 -65,618 1,597 
FNGNWMMNGEM3 27,120  13,032  56,208 44,825 15,363 -18,331 -41,484 -18,002  -4,542 -5,643 -1,650 0 -69,340 -2,446 
FNGEMMNGEM3 60,229  12,867  62,588 98,872 15,410 -18,331 -41,700 -36,132  -2,180 -2,652 -3,178 -4,440 -72,766 68,589 
FNGSEMMNGEM3 57,532  13,826  62,464 60,779 15,485 -18,331 -41,696 -24,345  -2,390 -2,504 -1,290 0 -69,617 49,911 
FGNWMMNGEM3 27,120  13,028  54,399 44,825 14,725 -15,245 -38,846 -17,967  -4,352 -5,143 -1,650 0 -66,100 4,794 
FGEMMNGEM3 56,029  13,004  57,363 83,395 14,739 -15,245 -38,846 -36,103  -1,991 -2,484 -3,177 -4,040 -69,467 53,176 
FGSEMMNGEM3 64,623  13,815  59,356 60,779 14,788 -15,245 -38,846 -24,155  -2,184 -2,268 -1,290 0 -66,350 63,024 
FNGNWMMNGSEM3 23,534  14,719  55,702 12,591 15,433 -18,331 -41,484 -8,478  -4,554 0 -361 0 -65,805 -17,033 
FNGEMMNGSEM3 56,644  14,555  62,083 66,638 15,480 -18,331 -41,700 -26,607  -2,191 -2,911 -1,888 -4,440 -69,231 48,100 
FNGSEMMNGSEM3 53,946  15,514  61,959 28,545 15,555 -18,331 -41,696 -14,821  -2,402 0 0 0 -66,082 32,186 
FGNWMMNGSEM3 23,534  14,716  53,894 12,591 14,795 -15,245 -38,846 -8,443  -4,364 0 -361 0 -62,565 -10,293 
FGEMMNGSEM3 52,444  14,691  56,857 51,161 14,809 -15,245 -38,846 -26,579  -2,002 -2,714 -1,888 -4,040 -65,932 32,716 
FGSEMMNGSEM3 61,037  15,503  58,851 28,545 14,859 -15,245 -38,846 -14,631  -2,195 0 0 0 -62,815 45,062 
FNGNWMMGNWM3 0  9,697  52,509 0 15,307 -15,956 -43,030 -4,943  0 0 -637 0 -68,608 -55,660 
FNGEMMGNWM3 33,110  9,532  58,890 54,047 15,355 -15,956 -43,030 -23,073  -3,567 -6,977 -2,164 -4,440 -72,034 -306 
FNGSEMMGNWM3 30,412  10,491  58,766 15,954 15,430 -15,956 -43,030 -11,286  -3,777 0 -276 0 -68,885 -12,158 
FGNWMMGNWM3 0  9,693  50,701 0 14,670 -15,245 -38,846 -4,908  0 0 -637 0 -65,368 -49,940 
FGEMMGNWM3 28,910  9,669  53,664 38,570 14,683 -15,245 -38,846 -23,044  -3,378 -6,494 -2,164 -4,040 -68,735 -16,449 
FGSEMMGNWM3 37,503  10,480  55,658 15,954 14,733 -15,245 -38,846 -11,096  -3,570 0 -276 0 -65,618 -323 
FNGNWMMGEM3 27,403  13,179  53,237 42,779 15,255 -15,956 -43,030 -18,002  -4,542 -6,413 -1,650 0 -69,507 -7,249 
FNGEMMGEM3 60,513  13,014  59,618 96,825 15,302 -15,956 -43,030 -36,132  -2,180 -3,201 -3,178 -4,440 -72,933 64,223 
FNGSEMMGEM3 57,815  13,973  59,493 58,732 15,377 -15,956 -43,030 -24,345  -2,390 -3,281 -1,290 0 -69,784 45,314 
FGNWMMGEM3 27,403  13,175  51,429 42,779 14,617 -15,245 -38,846 -17,967  -4,352 -4,273 -1,650 0 -66,267 802 
FGEMMGEM3 56,313  13,151  54,392 81,349 14,630 -15,245 -38,846 -36,103  -1,991 -2,484 -3,177 -4,040 -69,634 48,313 
FGSEMMGEM3 64,906  13,962  56,386 58,732 14,680 -15,245 -38,846 -24,155  -2,184 -2,268 -1,290 0 -66,518 58,162 
FNGNWMMGSEM3 26,948  14,656  53,897 9,856 15,383 -15,956 -43,030 -8,478  -4,554 0 -361 0 -65,736 -17,373 
FNGEMMGSEM3 60,058  14,492  60,278 63,903 15,430 -15,956 -43,030 -26,607  -2,191 -4,342 -1,888 -4,440 -69,162 46,545 
FNGSEMMGSEM3 57,360  15,440  58,296 25,810 14,869 -15,245 -38,846 -14,631  -2,195 0 0 0 -62,746 38,113 
FGNWMMGSEM3 26,948  14,653  52,089 9,856 14,745 -15,245 -38,846 -8,443  -4,364 0 -361 0 -62,496 -11,463 
FGEMMGSEM3 55,858  14,628  55,052 48,427 14,759 -15,245 -38,846 -26,579  -2,002 -3,500 -1,888 -4,040 -65,863 30,760 
FGSEMMGSEM3 64,451  15,440  57,046 25,810 14,808 -15,245 -38,846 -14,631  -2,195 0 0 0 -62,746 43,892 
FNGNWS3 0  8,012  47,394 0 11,853 -14,240 -41,484 -437  0 0 -361 0 -53,497 -42,760 
FNGES3 33,995  7,612  44,282 58,602 11,929 -14,240 -41,700 -18,378  -2,306 -5,651 -1,981 -4,440 -56,924 10,801 
FNGSES3 45,845  8,751  38,750 22,099 12,070 -14,240 -41,696 -8,247  -2,306 0 0 0 -53,782 7,243 
FGNWS3 0  8,009  44,852 0 11,215 -11,942 -38,846 -421  0 0 -361 0 -50,257 -37,751 
FGES3   33,964  7,770  41,307 40,312 11,293 -11,942 -38,846 -18,369  -2,082 -5,192 -1,981 -4,040 -53,869 -1,675 
FGSES3 45,845  8,740  37,761 22,099 11,434 -11,942 -38,846 -8,063  -2,082 0 0 0 -50,515 14,431 
MNGNWS3 0  2,297  22,042 0 5,423 -4,924 0 -124  0 0 -276 0 -21,688 2,750 
MNGES3 34,997  5,747  26,840 56,817 5,442 -4,924 0 -13,212  0 0 -1,405 0 -22,592 87,709 
MNGSES3 23,961  7,439  26,313 17,245 5,555 -4,924 0 -3,659  0 0 0 0 -18,576 53,355 
MGNWS3 0  2,297  21,453 0 5,442 -3,972 0 -124  0 0 -276 0 -21,688 3,134 
MGES3 34,997  5,747  28,681 48,155 5,556 -3,972 0 -13,212  0 0 -1,405 0 -22,430 82,117 
MGSES3 23,961  7,439  28,506 17,245 5,593 -3,972 0 -3,659  0 0 0 0 -18,576 56,538 ___________________SARTOR, AZZARRI, COZZOLINO, DECLICH, POLIN & ROVEDA  ___________________  
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Table 6. Marginal net subsidy (euro) 
  First child  Second child  Third child 
    of which    of which    of which 
  Net Indirect Net Indirect Net Indirect 
  taxes taxes taxes taxes taxes taxes 
            
Family types        
  
FNGNWMMNGNWM  -21,156 3,415 -22,099 6,324 -19,980 3,420 
FNGEMMNGNWM  -24,247 3,459 -27,675 5,874 -21,369 5,005 
FNGSEMMNGNWM  -23,272 2,556 -23,650 6,469 -19,749 4,868 
FGNWMMNGNWM  -19,874 2,830 -18,635 5,071 -20,368 3,449 
FGEMMNGNWM  -22,193 2,633 -23,024 4,285 -22,124 4,130 
FGSEMMNGNWM  -20,050 3,156 -18,228 5,970 -22,064 2,390 
FNGNWMMNGEM  -24,546 2,085 -26,026 5,654 -20,762 3,543 
FNGEMMNGEM  -25,603 2,130 -26,745 5,205 -20,538 5,127 
FNGSEMMNGEM  -25,474 1,226 -25,569 5,800 -19,767 4,990 
FGNWMMNGEM  -23,051 1,501 -22,008 4,402 -21,227 3,571 
FGEMMNGEM  -24,200 1,303 -22,935 3,615 -21,874 4,252 
FGSEMMNGEM  -22,735 1,826 -20,761 5,301 -22,669 2,512 
FNGNWMMNGSEM  -24,342  579  -23,074 6,050 -21,204 2,878 
FNGEMMNGSEM  -27,302  624  -26,538 5,600 -21,119 4,463 
FNGSEMMNGSEM  -26,199 -280 -23,957 6,195 -20,309 4,326 
FGNWMMNGSEM  -23,001  -5  -19,486 4,798 -21,585 2,906 
FGEMMNGSEM  -25,886 -203 -22,695 4,011 -22,473 3,588 
FGSEMMNGSEM  -23,531  321  -19,351 5,696 -23,173 1,847 
FNGNWMMGNWM  -21,591 3,415 -22,607 6,324 -20,398 3,420 
FNGEMMGNWM  -24,613 3,459 -28,102 5,874 -21,721 5,005 
FNGSEMMGNWM  -23,640 2,556 -24,079 6,469 -20,102 4,868 
FGNWMMGNWM  -19,874 2,830 -18,635 5,071 -20,368 3,449 
FGEMMGNWM  -22,725 2,633 -23,582 4,285 -22,790 4,130 
FGSEMMGNWM  -20,605 3,156 -19,044 5,970 -22,613 2,390 
FNGNWMMGEM  -25,017 1,991 -26,623 5,566 -23,754 2,614 
FNGEMMGEM  -26,053 2,035 -27,275 5,116 -22,412 4,199 
FNGSEMMGEM  -25,926 1,132 -26,100 5,712 -21,868 4,062 
FGNWMMGEM  -23,087 1,406 -22,097 4,314 -22,160 2,643 
FGEMMGEM  -24,284 1,209 -23,037 3,527 -22,846 3,324 
FGSEMMGEM  -22,819 1,732 -20,863 5,213 -23,641 1,583 
FNGNWMMGSEM  -21,851 3,415 -25,718 3,936 -21,063 3,420 
FNGEMMGSEM  -23,479 3,459 -29,151 3,486 -21,615 5,005 
FNGSEMMGSEM  -21,838 1,947 -22,280 2,814 -20,092 4,887 
FGNWMMGSEM  -20,075 2,830 -21,622 2,683 -21,026 3,449 
FGEMMGSEM  -21,696 2,633 -24,881 1,897 -21,971 4,130 
FGSEMMGSEM  -20,605 3,156 -21,488 3,582 -22,613 2,390 
FNGNWS  -19,331 5,266 -19,394 8,935 -15,956 7,362 
FNGES  -27,066 2,092 -26,157 6,449 -21,690 5,233 
FNGSES  -25,758  37  -27,059 2,919 -22,798 1,940 
FGNWS  -18,787 3,970 -16,395 7,231 -16,469 7,265 
FGES  -25,364 1,523 -21,913 5,166 -23,167 4,115 
FGSES  -24,413 -630 -22,757 2,156 -23,062 2,019 
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Table 7.  Public programmes for families with children – annual values (euro)   
Age Health  Education  Tax  credit Family 
Allowances
a 
Maternity 
Allowances
b 
Total 
   School  University    (1)  (2) 
 
 
0 -1,412 0  0 -178 -771  -376 -2,738 
5 -636  -4,482 0  -184  -767  0  -6,068 
10 -377  -6,295 0 -191 -617  0  -7,479 
15 -425  -5,496 0 -221 -514  0  -6,657 
20 -596  -1,891  -2,221  -242 -298  0  -5,249 
25 -834 -56 -907  -194 -167  0  -2,157 
 
(a) When the share of wages on family income exceeds 70%. 
(b) For employed women only. ___________________SARTOR, AZZARRI, COZZOLINO, DECLICH, POLIN & ROVEDA  ___________________  
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Table 8. Revenues and expenditure of the public sector in Italy, 1999 (thousands of euro) 
Revenues 
1. Net operating surplus 
2. Direct taxes 
2.1 Taxes on labour 
IRPEF on labour income (net of tax 
allowances)       
Tax allowances 
As spouse 
As children 
2.2 Taxes on real capital 
2.2.1 Equity and stocks 
Irpef on capital 
Irpeg 
Tax on dividends 
Tax on net wealth of firms 
2.2.2 Real estate 
Irpef on real estate 
Invim 
ICI on building sites 
2.3 Taxes on financial capital 
 Tax on income from financial capital 
2.4 ILOR 
2.5 Vehicle tax on families 
2.6 Other direct taxes 
3. Indirect taxes 
(net of those paid by public sector) 
VAT 
IRAP on labour income 
IRAP on income from capital 
ICI (local tax on real estate) 
Stamp duties 
Hydrocarbons oil tax 
Petroleum and gas tax 
Electric energy 
Tobacco 
Betting, gaming and lottery 
Concessions 
Vehicle tax on families 
Other indirect taxes 
4. Social contributions 
4.1 Workers 
Employee 
Self employed 
4.2 Employers 
5. Other transfers 
6. International transfers 
7. Other current revenues 
8. Capital  tax 
Inheritance tax 
Other capital tax 
9. Contributions to investment 
10. Other capital revenues 
11. Interests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total revenues 
592
170,919
99,307
99,307
-5,542
-3,707
-1,835
53,976
44,310
15,826
27,559
412
513
4,833
2,738
1,222
873
8,918
8,918
0
3,259
5,458
155,282
64,922
14,977
2,800
8,177
12,690
23,996
4,939
2,839
7,164
6,659
2,076
1,978
2,065
139,866
39,863
27,514
12,349
100,003
12,423
774
5,348
1,164
907
257
1,949
2,457
2,269
488,209
Expenditure 
1. Compensation of employees 
Social security 
Health 
Assistance 
Education 
School 
University 
Other labor income 
2. Intermediate consumption 
2.1 Social benefits in kind 
Health 
Hospital care 
Other health serv. 
Drugs 
Assistance 
2.2 Other intermediate consumption 
Social security 
Health 
Assistance 
Education 
School 
University 
Other  
3.Revenues from sales of goods and serv. 
Litter tax 
4. Contribution to production 
5. Social expenditure 
5. 1 Social security 
5.1.1 Retirement pensions 
Old age and seniority 
Employees 
Self employed 
Survival 
Employees 
Self employed 
Invalidity 
Employees 
Self employed 
5.1.2 Labor market and family 
Unemployment and mobility benefit 
Income support for the unemployed 
Sickness and injuries allowance 
Maternity allowance 
Industrial injuries rent 
Severance pay 
Family benefits 
Other  
5.2 Assistance 
Social pensions  
Disability pensions 
War pensions 
Other  
6. Transfers to non profit institutions 
7. International transfers 
8. Other transfers 
9. Other current expenditure 
10. Interests 
11. Investments 
Social security and assistance 
Health 
Housing 
Education 
Other 
12.  Contribution to investments 
13. Other capital account transfers 
Total Expenditure 
Net borrowing requirement 
117,371
2,326
23,226
1,204
35,821
30,986
4,836
54,793
77,883
24,001
22,943
4,945
10,626
7,372
3,965
53,882
1,404
11,673
1,668
6,043
5,640
402
33,095
-23,632
-4,106
14,480
191,279
178,794
156,473
123,553
110,819
12,734
29,729
26,665
3,064
3,192
2,863
329
22,321
3,926
671
2,050
1,352
3,700
5,220
4,896
505
12,485
2,091
8,289
1,120
985
3,785
6,224
2,894
363
75,261
28,980
452
1,553
5,286
2,672
19,016
10,750
3,494
509,132
-20,922
Source: Our elaborations on ISTAT (2001) and Ministero del Tesoro, del Bilancio e della Programmazione Economica (2000). _____________________ INTRAGENERATIONAL DISTRIBUTION ACROSS FAMILIES   ____________________  
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Figure 1. Family formation (financial independence) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Our elaborations on ISTAT (1997) data. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Marriage  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Our elaborations on ISTAT (1997) data. 
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Figure 3a. Fertility rate – one child 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Our elaborations on Istat (1997) data. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3b. Fertility rate – two children (first child) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Our elaborations on Istat (1997) data. 
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Figure 3c. Fertility rate – two children (second child) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Our elaborations on Istat (1997) data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3d. Fertility rate –three children (first child) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Our elaborations on Istat (1997) data. 
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Figure 3e. Fertility rate – three children (second child) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Our elaborations on Istat (1997) data. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3f. Fertility rate – three children (third child) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Our elaborations on Istat (1997) data. 
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Figure 4. Marginal net subsidy  
Source: Our elaborations. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FAMILY BURDENS AND THE TRANSFER/TAX SYSTEM IN GERMANY 
BERNHARD SEIDEL
* 
ecently, the federal German government published a report on poverty and wealth of 
private households in Germany.
1 It shows that young families with small children bear 
an increased risk of becoming poor, mainly because several effects responsible for 
poverty come together: low income, high needs for establishing the household, constrained 
ability for full employment or even unemployment. Especially children brought up by single 
parents – mostly the mother – run a high risk of being poor. If the threshold of poverty is 
measured by half of the average income, roughly 30% of single-parent households with children 
have to be classified as poor in 1998. As measured by all private households it was only 10%. 
The quota of children up to the age of 18 receiving social assistance amounted to 6.8% in 1998 
and, therefore, was nearly twice the percentage found in the average population. Even if the 
great bulk of German families live at much better conditions, the figures show clearly that 
bringing up children means a heavy financial burden for families. There are several measures to 
support the families by direct transfers and tax allowances. Obviously, for a substantial part of 
the population, the tax/transfer-system does not ensure that children do not grow up in poverty. 
Therefore, one has to ask how those measures to partially alleviate family burdens are structured 
and what are the advantages and shortcomings. This paper briefly describes and evaluates the 
tax and transfer measures for families in Germany. The contribution concentrates on the most 
important direct financial advantages of the German tax and transfer system. Not mentioned are 
the maternity benefits and the indirect advantages connected with the old-age pension system 
which provide – compared with the direct paid contributions – higher claims for mothers and 
with the social health system in which dependent family members are insured together with the 
employed parents on the basis of a contribution of the same amount as for a single employee. 
1.  The German Tax and Transfer System to Support Families 
The German system contains several strands of family support. On the one hand, there are 
general transfers granted to families and on the other, specific transfers are awarded for special 
uses, such as professional training or part-time domestic help. Finally, the income tax system 
includes certain allowances for taxpayers’ expenditures related to children or to marriage. Only 
a few of those measures are means-tested; some are related to income limits, whereas others are 
oriented to the factual expenditure or are – within limits - related to the individual’s income. 
1.1  General support 
Among the general measures, the support payment for dependent children (Kindergeld) is the 
most important one; it is granted in a form of an income tax refund independently of the 
individual income of the family. It depends on the number of children. In recent years, the 
Kindergeld has been increased several times. Since 1 January 2000, it amounts to 270 DM 
(around €135) monthly for the first and second child, 300 DM (€150) for the third child and 350 
DM (€175) for the fourth and any subsequent children. The payment is provided for all children 
up to the age of 18, for children participating in professional training or without a place for 
apprenticeship up to an age of 27 and for unemployed children of a maximum age of 21 years. 
If children above 18 years earn on their own a yearly income beyond 13,500 DM (€6,750), 
Kindergeld does not apply any further. Kindergeld is determined and paid by the family 
                                                 
* DIW Berlin, Königin-Luise-Str. 5, D-14195 Berlin (e-mail: bseidel@diw.de). 
1 Lebenslagen in Deutschland. Der erste Armuts- und Reichtumsbericht der Bundesregierung. 
http://www.bma.bund.de/de/Sicherung/armutsbericht/ARBBericht01.pdf 
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exchequers of the Labour Offices or of the civil service. It is paid to the person responsible 
where the child is living.  
Families with a higher income make use of the children’s allowance (Kinderfreibetrag) and the 
child care allowance (Betreuungsfreibetrag) in the context of income taxation. The 
Kinderfreibetrag amounts yearly to 6,912 DM (around €3,450). The Betreuungsfreibetrag, 
which is granted for children of an age under 16 years, adds up yearly to 3,024 DM (€1,510). 
These allowances are charged against the direct support payments for dependent children. 
Therefore, only families of higher income are profiting by these measures. The tax authorities 
take the allowances into account officially on the occasion of the income tax assessment. 
Single parents can also claim for a special household allowance (Haushaltsfreibetrag). In 
contrast to the Betreuungsfreibetrag, this benefit is not charged against the Kindergeld. 
However, the allowance is supposed to be revised next year, because the constitutional court has 
ruled that the allowance is an unjustified advantage for single parents compared to couples with 
children and therefore must be changed. 
The transfers for children within the framework of social assistance could be seen as a general 
transfer as well, because it does not oblige the recipient to apply the benefit to special uses. 
However, it is restricted to certain groups of the population. This is because in contrast to the 
above-described financial support measures, the social assistance is strictly means-tested. 
Therefore, only persons without adequate own financial resources can benefit from the social 
assistance for subsistence (Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt).  
The amounts differ slightly between the German regional levels (Länder) because of differences 
in the regional costs of living. On average the monthly support for the head of the household 
and for singles amounts to 550 DM (€275). The transfers for other members of the household 
differ according to their age. For a child up to 7 years, 50% of this sum (275 DM) is paid, for a 
child between 7 and 13 years 65% (357 DM), for a child between 14 and 17 years 90% (495 
DM), and for older children (and other persons belonging to the household), 80% (440 DM) is 
paid. In addition to these general transfers, specific social assistance is given especially as 
housing benefit and as help in special living conditions. 
To give more incentives to families to raise children in Germany, a federal child-rearing benefit 
(Bundeserziehungsgeld) is granted to all mothers or fathers who educate and care for their 
children by themselves. The corresponding law was recently revised. Since the beginning of 
2001, parents get this benefit on application, if they are working part-time up to 30 hours/week. 
The beneficiaries can choose between two alternatives: A standard maximum amount of 600 
DM per month is granted up to the end of the child's second year; a budgetary supplement of a 
maximum of 900 DM per month is provided for the child's first twelve months. If the net 
income for the couple with one child does not exceed 100,000 DM yearly (for a single 75,000 
DM respectively), the benefit is paid for the first 6 months after the birth of the child as full 
amount. From the 7
th month onwards, the benefit is shortened relative to the income of the 
parents, beginning from an income of 32,200 DM (couple) and 26,400 DM (single parent). It is 
fully cancelled if the net income of a couple amounts to 46,000 DM (€23,000), of a single 
parent 40,000 DM (€20,000), respectively. Maternity benefits are charged against the child-
rearing benefit. However, receiving unemployment benefits does not interfere with receiving the 
Bundeserziehungsgeld. Neither it is charged against unemployment help, social assistance, 
housing benefits or the promotion of vocational training. Some Länder grant further comparable 
benefits for raising children following the federal benefit.  
In addition to the financial benefit, employees have the right to parental free time (Elternzeit) 
within 3 years, even at the same time. Both can reduce their work week to between 15 and 30 
hours, if they are employed in companies with 15 or more employees. During the period of 
parental free time, parents are protected against layoffs.   SEIDEL 
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1.2  Specific support 
There are several opportunities offered as special support for families. First, parents can legally 
claim for child care for a child of age 3 onwards. They have to pay a financial contribution, 
which depends on their income, but do not bear the full costs of providing child care. Moreover, 
if the father or mother is insured in the obligatory health care insurance, they can receive 
domestic help if, because of a stay in hospital or a rehabilitation institution or even in the case of 
illness, the normal organisation of the household is disrupted. However, one child has to be 
under 12 years of age or handicapped. For several few years, general support has been available 
to employ part-time domestic help; yearly costs up to 18,000 DM (€9,000) can be deducted as 
special expenses from the taxable income, and there are simplified administrative and financial 
procedures for dealing with the social insurance bodies. This support, however, is not restricted 
to families but is available to everyone. 
In the case of illness of a child under 12 years of age, employed mothers and fathers who are 
insured under the obligatory health insurance have the right to be absent from work to care for 
their child. This benefit is restricted to ten days per parent per child and per year or to 20 days 
per single parent per child and per year. If there is more than one child, it is a maximum of 50 
days for a single parent, or 25 days respectively for each parent. If there is no obligation for the 
employer to make continued payment, under certain conditions the health insurance will provide 
a sickness benefit.  
There are some measures to promote the vocational training of the children and of young 
parents as well. With respect to children, parents can make use of an educational allowance 
(Ausbildungsfreibetrag) in the case both of an academic education or professional training of 
their children. The allowance depends on the age and on the place of residence of the children. 
For children being trained or educated far from the parental household, the allowance amounts 
to 1,800 DM yearly if they are under 18 years; otherwise, 4,200 DM. If the children above an 
age of 18 are living with their parents the educational allowance amounts to 2,400 DM per year. 
This allowance is granted in addition to the Kindergeld or to the children's allowance. Direct 
financial support to promote vocational training is charged against the educational allowance. 
The same is true for any income earned by the children.
2  
Depending on the income of the parents, financial support (BAföG, 
Bundesausbildungsförderungsgesetz) is granted for promoting visits to secondary general or 
vocational schools and the universities. For the visit to schools, contributions to the costs of 
external accommodation is provided; for a study at universities the grant covers half a 
contribution, and the other half is an interest-free loan. At a maximum, the regular monthly 
grant for students amounts to 785 DM in the new Bundesländer and to 955 DM in the old 
Länder, if the students are not living with their parents.
3 
Corresponding to the promotion of university education, apprentices can claim for a financial 
contribution to the cost of vocational training or preparation courses as well, if their own income 
and the income of their parents and married partners are not sufficient. In the case of 
educational measures preparing for a profession, special expenditures are borne by the public 
independent of the income of the beneficiary or his relatives with statutory support obligations.  
If adults with children are participating in vocational training, in qualifying measures or are 
studying at universities, they can make use of higher grants or softer conditions of the 
promotion measures. 
                                                 
2 From 3,600 DM per year onwards. 
3 In the case of above-average housing rents, the grant amounts to 1,020 DM and 1,030 DM respectively.  F AMILY BURDENS AND THE TRANSFER/TAX SYSTEM IN GERMANY 
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Financial support is granted as well for housing. In the framework of general measures to 
support an adequate supply of housing, additional help is given to families. This is the case for 
housing subsidies that are paid to low-income households to bear the rent (Wohngeld) or the 
burden of running one’s own house or dwelling (Lastenzuschuss). The means-tested subsidy 
depends on the number of persons in the household. The law was amended early in 2001, to 
increase the subsidies mainly for families with two or more children.  
Other measures attempt to promote home ownership for one’s own use (Eigenheimzulage). 
Over a period of 8 years, a new owner can claim one time only up to 5,000 DM annually for 
buying a new house and up to 2,500 DM annually for buying an old one or for the extension or 
enlargement of his own house. For each child the grant is increased by 1,500 DM annually. The 
benefit is not awarded to high-income people; the corresponding threshold amounts to 160,000 
DM for a single person and 320,000 DM for a couple and is increased by 60,000 per child. 
1.3  Splitting: Advantage for couples more than for families  
The German income tax law contains a remarkable advantage for married couples: the 
individual incomes of the spouses are not taxed separately but the joint taxable income is split in 
two halves which are then taxed under the progressive tax schedule. If both spouses are earning 
an income of a similar level, splitting will not lead to an advantage. In the case of differences 
between the incomes of the spouses, the splitting procedure diminishes the effect of tax 
progression for the higher income. The maximum splitting advantage amounts to roughly 
20,000 DM per year. However, the splitting is bound only to marriage, not to children. 
According to tradition it is based on the socio-political model of the one bread-earner family in 
which one partner, usually the wife, was caring for the home and the children, while the other 
was working. In modern times, there is a broad spectrum of models for organising a household 
and raising children, but this is not reflected in the German income tax law. Reform of this 
practice of splitting is on the political agenda. 
2.  Evaluation and Reform Perspectives 
Despite the fact that there is a broad spectrum of family support in Germany, several 
shortcomings may be mentioned. First of all, the system does not prevent a significant number 
of children from living in poverty. This is because the financial support for children does not 
correspond to the amount needed to raise children. This is true for low-qualified and low-
income groups, mainly for single parents who often are not able to work full-time because of 
their obligations to care for and educate the children. The Kindergeld as the regular support is 
significantly lower than the sum granted by social assistance for children to parents who do not 
earn any income. If there are several children in a family, the pay of a low qualified worker 
including the regular transfer payments for the children could be only slightly higher or even 
lower than what is granted to a family as social assistance. Therefore, people who can expect 
only a low income because of their low qualifications sometimes do not have much incentive to 
work and to earn the subsistence support for their family. 
There is an ongoing debate in Germany to increase the financial support for children. Several 
proposals are on the political agenda. Recently, the Government decided on a draft of a second 
law for family support. The first was enacted two years ago. It contains several measures: first, 
to raise the support payment for the dependent first and second child by roughly 30 DM up to 
300 DM monthly beginning next year, second, to increase the children’s allowance to 7,135 DM 
(€3,648) and to extend the child care allowance to children of more than 16 years in case they 
are participating in general education or professional training. Further, the child care allowance 
will be combined with a general education allowance. If the effective cost of attending children 
up to an age of 14 are higher than the general child care allowance, a maximum of an additional 
3,000 DM in expenses for institutional care or for care givers could be deducted from the   SEIDEL 
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taxable income. On the other side, cuts of existing measures have also been taken. This is the 
case as well for costs to employ domestic help. The allowance for the children’s general and 
professional training will be cancelled too. An additional allowance up to 1,807 DM will be 
granted only in the case that a child of more than 21 does not live in the parental household 
because of their education and training. Moreover, the household allowance for single parents 
will be cut in subsequent steps. The draft has to pass Parliament and the Bundesrat, the chamber 
of the states’ representatives.  
The Conservative Party is demanding a subsequent increase in the payment so that after ten 
years the support would amount to 1,000 DM. However, it remains open how this can be 
financed and be integrated into a consistent concept for the promotion of families. The Green 
Party is also demanding a substantial increase of the general support payment. This proposal is 
linked to a demand to restrict the tax income splitting for spouses which in a strict sense is not a 
support for families because it is bound to the marriage rather than to the children. 
What is needed as well in order to encourage adults to become more engaged themselves with 
their children is to provide more opportunities to reconcile competing job and family duties, not 
only for mothers but also for fathers as well. For this purpose one could mention inter alia the 
creation of more places in nurseries and kindergartens and all-day schools. At a minimum, it is 
important to raise the acceptance for part-time work of both of the parents and to promote the 
equal labour participation of women. Some steps had been taken in the past; however, more has 
to be done in the future.   F AMILY BURDENS AND THE TRANSFER/TAX SYSTEM IN GERMANY 
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